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Abstract
Schizophrenia is a complex condition which manifests in a broad variety of symptoms, 
including alterations in the subjective experience of one as a self within the world, which are 
termed self disorders. Experiences similar to these clinical schizophrenia symptoms can also 
be found in non-clinical populations, such as in individuals high in schizotypy, which is a 
psychometric measure of a dimension of uncommon experiences and behaviours. There are 
also known to be symptoms related to disorders of agency in the schizophrenia spectrum, such 
as delusions of control, in which the feeling of control over one's actions is disrupted. The aim 
of  this  thesis  was to  examine the  relationship  between disorders  of  self  and disorders  of 
agency in the schizophrenic spectrum. 
The  thesis  consists  of  three  papers  spanning  from  a  theoretical  background  to  two 
behavioural  studies.  The  first  paper  is  a  theoretical  examination  of  the  experimental 
paradigms  which  are  used  for  measuring  agency.  It  also  discusses  how  apparently 
contradictory  empirical  findings  regarding  disorders  of  agency  in  schizophrenia  can  be 
understood. It lays the theoretical background for the experimental papers.
The second paper refers to a behavioural study of 50 participants using a novel semi-
structured interview, based upon a phenomenological conception of self disorder. It addresses 
whether self disorder symptoms typically found in schizophrenia are also found in a non-
clinical high-schizotypy population and whether these symptoms can be measured reliably 
with this technique. The measurement of self disorders in this format was found to have good 
inter-rater reliability, and these symptoms were indeed found more among high-schizotypy 
than low-schizotypy people.
The third paper used eye tracking to examine whether the deficits in volitional saccades 
found  in  schizophrenia  would  also  be  found  in  26  non-clinical  high-schizotypy subjects. 
Comparing  volitional  to  visually-guided  saccade  allows  experimental  manipulation  of  the 
degree of agency over the eye movement that a subject experiences. There were no significant 
differences in latencies between groups of high- and low-schizotypy people in any condition. 
However,  a  strong negative  correlation  between visually  guided  saccade  latency and  self 
disorder score was found. This is the first time that a link from self disorder symptoms to 
performance in eye movement tasks has been made.
There are both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for a link between disorders 
of self and of agency in the schizophrenic spectrum. Implications of this for both research and 
clinical settings will be considered. This thesis represents a novel interdisciplinary approach 
to the study of schizophrenia spectrum conditions by incorporating concepts of self disorder 
from phenomenology into experimental paradigms.
Zusammenfassung
Schizophrenie  ist  eine  komplexe  Störung,  die  sich  in  einer  Vielzahl  von  Symptomen 
manifestiert. Diese schließen Änderungen in der subjektiven Wahrnehmung von sich als ein 
Selbst  in  der  Welt  ein,  die  als  Selbststörungen  bezeichnet  werden.  Wahrnehmungen,  die 
diesen  klinischen Symptomen von Schizophrenie ähneln,  können auch in  nicht-klinischen 
Populationen  gefunden  werden.  Dazu  gehören  Individuen  mit  ausgeprägter  Schizotypie, 
einem  psychophysischen  Maß  einer  Dimension  ungewöhnlicher  Wahrnehmungen  und 
Verhaltensweisen. Es sind auch Symptome bekannt, die in Bezug zu Störungen von "Agency" 
(Urheberschaft)  innerhalb  des  Schizophrenie-Spektrums  stehen.  Dazu  gehören 
Wahnvorstellungen von Kontrolle, bei denen das Gefühl der Steuerung eigener Handlungen 
gestört ist. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation war die Untersuchung des Zusammenhanges zwischen 
Selbststörungen und Störungen von Agency im schizophrenen Spektrum. 
Die Dissertation besteht aus drei Artikeln, die sowohl eine theoretische Abhandlung als 
auch zwei Verhaltensstudien umfassen. Der erste Artikel ist eine theoretische Beurteilung der 
experimentellen Paradigmen, die zur Messung von Agency verwendet werden. Es setzt sich 
auch mit dem Verständnis von scheinbar widersprüchlichen empirischen Befunden bezüglich 
Störungen  von  Agency  in  der  Schizophrenie  auseinander.  Dieses  Paper  liefert  den 
theoretischen Hintergrund für die beiden experimentellen Artikel.
Der  zweite  Artikel  beschreibt  eine  Verhaltensstudie,  in  der  50  Probanden  an  einem 
semistrukturiertes  Gespräch  teilnahmen.  Dieses  Gespräch  wurde  mit  einem  eigens 
entwickelten  Fragebogen  zur  Selbststörung  durchgeführt,  welches  auf  einer 
phenomänologischen Auffassung der  Selbststörung basiert.  Das Ziel  dieser Studie war,  zu 
untersuchen, ob Selbststörungssymptome, welche bei der Schizophrenie auftreten, ebenfalls 
in einer nicht-klinischen Population mit erhöhter Schizotypie zu finden sind. Außerdem sollte 
bestimmt werden, ob der neue Fragebogen Selbststörungssymptome verlässlich misst. In der 
Tat  zeigte die  Messung anhand dieses Fragebogens eine hohe Übereinstimmung zwischen 
verschiedenen Bewertern. Des weiteren wurden Selbststörungssymptome, wie vorhergesagt, 
häufiger bei Personen mit höheren Schizotypie-Werten beobachtet.
In  der  im  dritten  Artikel  beschriebenen  Studie  wurde  bei  26  Probanden  Eyetracking 
verwendet, um zu untersuchen, ob die bei der Schizophrenie zu beobachtenden Defizite bei 
willentlichen Sakkaden auch bei Personen mit nicht-klinisch erhöhter Schizotypie auftreten. 
Der  Vergleich  zwischen  willentlichen  und  visuell  geführten  Sakkaden  ermöglicht  die 
experimentelle  Manipulation  des  Grades  an  empfundener  Agency  über  die 
Augenbewegungen.  Bei  den  Latenzen  wurden  keine  signifikanten  Unterschiede  in  den 
experimentellen Bedingungen zwischen den Gruppen mit höherer und niedrigerer Schizotypie 
gefunden. Jedoch ergab sich eine starke negative Korrelation zwischen der Reaktionszeit bei 
visuell geführten Sakkaden und dem Grad der Selbststörung.
Mit  dieser  Studie  wird  zum  ersten  Mal  ein  Zusammenhang  zwischen 
Selbststörungssymptomen  und  Verhalten  in  einer  Augenbewegungsaufgabe  nachgewiesen. 
Zusammenfassend gibt es also sowohl theoretische Argumente als auch empirische Belege, 
die für einen Zusammenhang von Selbststörungen und Störungen von Agency innerhalb des 
Spektrums  der  Schizophrenie  sprechen.  Implikationen  für  die  Forschung  und  für  den 
klinischen  Kontext  werden  diskutiert.  Diese  Dissertation  benutzt  einen  neuartigen 
interdisziplinären Ansatz zur Untersuchung von Störungen im Spektrum der Schizophrenie, 
indem sie experimentelle Paradigmen aus Selbststörungs-Konzepten aus der Phänomenologie 
ableitet.
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1. Introduction
1.1. General comments
The  current  thesis  represents  an  interdisciplinary  effort  to  examine  the  underlying 
pathological constructs in the schizophrenic spectrum. To understand a condition as complex 
as schizophrenia, it can be beneficial to synthesise insights from a variety of different fields of 
study, which use different methodologies and theoretical models. This project includes work 
in both phenomenological psychiatry and experimental psychology, constructed on a base of 
philosophy of science. It is my hope that bringing together knowledge, methods and concepts 
from several  fields  may produce  both  new theories  and innovative  ways  of  testing  these 
theories empirically. 
1.2. Key concepts
1.2.1. The Schizophrenia Spectrum
The first challenge in investigating unusual experiences in mental disorders is to consider 
the definition, reliability and validity of the pathological condition in question. The nature of 
schizophrenia is a much contested topic, with some authors arguing that it  exists not as a 
single  disorder  but  as  a  group of  related  syndromes  (Carpenter  et  al.,  1999),  and  others 
arguing that the concept is invalid and should be discarded altogether (Read et al., 2004). The 
concept  of  a  schizophrenia  spectrum,  with  non-clinical  individuals  on one  end and those 
experiencing  severe  symptoms  on  the  other,  has  gained  momentum  and  interest  from 
researchers recently (Van Os et al., 2009). Conditions other than schizophrenia which may be 
considered  part  of  the  schizophrenia  spectrum include  schizotypical  personality  disorder, 
schizotypal personality disorder, schizophreniform disorder, and delusional disorders (Siever 
& Davis, 2004). A spectrum approach posits that signs and symptoms of schizophrenia would 
also be found to some extent  in non-clinical  people,  who would not  be diagnosable with 
schizophrenia or an other disorder.
The reporting of schizophrenia-like symptoms among non-clinical groups is of interest for 
reasons both theoretical and pragmatic. Theoretically speaking, the existence of symptoms 
considered phenemenologically paradigmatic of schizophrenia in non-clinical groups suggests 
that it is not the psychotic experience in and of itself which causes people to develop mental 
disorders, but something in the interpretation or integration of these experiences. That some 
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people  live  with  some of  the  symptoms of  schizophrenia  but  do  not  experience  them as 
distressing or disabling to a pathological degree may be illuminating of potential protective 
factors against developing the disorder. Pragmatically, it can be advantageous to work with 
non-clinical  populations  in  research  for  a  number  of  reasons:  ease  of  recruitment,  no 
medication confounds, and avoiding the confound of general cognitive impairments found in 
schizophrenia proper. 
This project focuses on non-clinical high-schizotypy populations, to examine schizotypy 
as  a  distinct  entity  and  also  to  consider  findings  and  theories  which  may be  applicable 
clinically to schizophrenic populations. Schizotypy here is defined as a psychometric measure 
of dimension of uncommon and odd experiences and behaviours, which is correlated with the 
risk of developing schizophrenia (Cyhlarova & Claridge, 2005). 
1.2.1.1. Schizophrenia as a disorder of self
Since its conception, schizophrenia has been characterised as a disorder of self: described 
as a “splitting of the psychological functions: as the disease becomes distinct, the personality 
loses its unity” (Bleuler, 1911). The so-called “first-rank symptoms” of schizophrenia define 
the blurring of the distinction between self and other (Schneider, 1959). This loss of ego-
boundaries, resulting in a distorted experience of self, has been described as the fundamental 
experience of schizophrenia, which gives rise to all other symptoms (Sims, 1991; Kimura, 
2001; Sass & Parnas, 2001).
This disordered experience of self can be seen particularly in the schizophrenic symptoms 
of thought insertion, in which patients believe that thoughts are being inserted into their minds 
by an outside agent (Schneider, 1959), and of motor passivity, in which patients believe that 
their  bodily  movements  are  being  controlled  by  another  (Maruff  et  al.,  2003).  These 
symptoms exemplify the failure to correctly identify self-produced actions and thoughts, due 
to a disturbance in the processing of information relating to self versus other.
Self  disorder  symptoms  have  also  been  observed  in  people  who  are  at  high  risk  for 
developing psychosis but have not yet developed a diagnosable disorder (Nelson, Thompson 
& Yung, 2012), suggesting that self disorder symptoms may be found on a continuum with 
healthy experience.  
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1.2.1.2. The Ipseity-Hyperreflexivity model
A recent prominent phenomenological model of schizophrenia relevant to this work is the 
Ipseity-Hyperreflexivity Model (IHM) (Parnas, Sass & Zahavi, 2008). This model posits two 
distortions of experience in schizophrenia: hyperreflexivity (excessive self-monitoring), and 
diminished ipseity (a reduction in the sense of self as a subject). 
Hyperreflexivity describes the experience of excessive awareness of, and attendance to, 
the normal process of body and mind. Intense focus on a particular perception can lead to 
noting detail at the expense of broader context; in this case, the intense focus is turned on the 
self. Thoughts or sensations which would normally be experienced as part of the self appear 
instead as subjects of an objectifying hyper-awareness. Excessive monitoring of internal states 
can  render  these  states  strange  or  alien,  such  as  in  the  abnormal  bodily  sensations 
(coenesthesias) experienced by some people with schizophrenia.
The other notion described in the IHM is loss of ipseity, or the immediate sense of “mine-
ness”  which  accompanies  our  perceptions,  actions  and feelings.  Ipseity  is  preflexive  –  it 
occurs as a necessary feature of being a mind, implicit in all over experience, which exists 
prior to reflection and judgement. In subjective experience, such as when eating an apple and 
experiencing the taste of it, you do not need to look for evidence to make a judgement of who 
is doing the tasting. It is an implicit part of the experience that it is something which happens 
to you. Hence our experiences involve a built-in reference to themselves as our experiences, 
which  Zahavi  and Parnas  (1998) have  argued constitutes  a  basic  form of  self-awareness. 
Ipseity is not a contingent feature of perception; rather it is the central tenet of what makes an 
experience subjective. Ipseity is the fundamental medium through which all perceptions and 
feelings are filtered, and it is that which gives rise to subjectivity and thus to a coherent sense 
of self. 
In schizophrenia, ipseity is reduced or absent from experience, and so both the world and 
the  body  seem  alien  and  unfamiliar.  The  self  is  no  longer  experienced  as  inhabiting  a 
comfortable relationship to mind and body. It is this disturbed sense of self which is posited to 
underlie the various clinical symptoms of schizophrenia. 
1.2.2. Sense of Agency
Sense of agency references to the experience of control we have over our movements and 
actions (Gallagher, 2007). This feeling is related to our understanding of ourselves as bodies 
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and as actors: as Helmholtz (1866) asked, when we see motion, how do we know that it is our 
eyes moving across the world, and not the world moving in front of our eyes? The challenge 
is to distinguish self-produced movements from movements of the outside world. We have a 
feeling of control over our movements, which seems natural and invisible to us in everyday 
life. However, this sense of agency can be disrupted, as seen in schizophrenia symptoms such 
as delusions of control. In fact, disruption in the experience of control has been posited to be 
the  causal  factor  leading  to  various  cognitive  and  social  problems  seen  in  schizophrenia 
(Kircher & Leube, 2003). 
It must be noted that the term "agency" is used in difference ways in different fields. It can 
be used to denote experiences ranging from control over motor movements (e.g., moving a 
finger) to making decisions which affect the outcome of one's life (e.g., deciding to become a 
scientist). This project will focus on what could be termed “low-level” agency, referring to 
simple voluntary motor actions. 
1.2.2.1. A note on terminology: agency and volition
The concept of volition is linked to agency in that both describe the relationship between 
one's willed intention and the awareness that one is causing events in the world. Volition is a 
term more commonly used in the psychology and cognitive neuroscience literature, in which 
it typically refers to our intentions to make simple, small motor movements, and the outcome 
of those intentions. Agency is a term more based in philosophy, which refers to the capacity of 
an  individual  to  enact  their  intentions  over  the  long-term,  in  ways  that  may  include 
movements, actions and communications. Here we will consider volitionality to be a term for 
the short-term, small-scale aspects of agentic experience.
1.2.2.2. Feeling of agency / Judgement of agency
An important conceptual distinction in agency research is between a feeling of agency 
(pre-reflective feeling of actions being yours) and a  judgement of agency (deciding that an 
action was yours after the fact) (Gallagher, 2007). Judgements of agency are reliant upon 
agentive  experiences  (i.e.,  experiences  of  feeling  of  agency),  which  are  based  on  the 
mechanisms responsible for action production. Feeling of agency, however, is pre-reflexive 
and  non-conceptual,  it  is  a  facet  of  experience  rather  than  something  which  can  be 
consciously reflected on.
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A similar distinction is proposed by Jeannerod (2009), who describes a "subpersonal" and 
automatic  level  of  action  identification,  unimpaired  in  schizophrenia,  and  a  "personal" 
conscious  level  of  what  he  calls  "sense  of  agency",  but  which  maps  more  closely  to  a 
"judgement of  agency".  Evidence  here  is  that  schizophrenic  patients  can  make automatic 
compensations  to  their  movements  given  distorted  visual  feedback  (showing  unimpaired 
automatic  action  awareness),  but  when the  distortions  are  large  they are  much slower to 
switch to a conscious strategy (Fourneret et al., 2001, 2002). The subpersonal level controls 
and adapts motor movements, while the personal level provides information about high level 
intentions and desires of the agent. 
1.3 Agency in Schizophrenia
There is evidence from both research and clinical settings that disorders of agency occur in 
schizophrenia. Clinically, symptoms such as motor passivity or thought insertion suggest a 
distortion  in  the  feeling  of  agency over  bodily  movements  or  thoughts.  Empirically,  one 
example is that schizophrenia patients are more susceptible to certain bodily illusions than 
controls, such as the rubber hand illusion (Costantini & Haggard, 2007), in which a rubber 
hand is placed next to the participant's hidden hand, and both hands are stroked at the same 
time.  This  give  rise  to  the  illusion  that  the  rubber  hand belongs  to  the  participant,  as  is 
experienced as part of their body. People with schizophrenia experience the illusion faster 
than  healthy  controls  (Peled  et  al.,  2003),  suggesting  a  increased  willingness  to  take 
ownership of external objects. This malleable sense of ownership over the body implies that 
the sense of agency may be similarly disrupted in schizophrenia, due to confusion regarding 
the distinction between self and other.
In this section, to further consider the topic of agency in schizophrenia, empirical evidence 
of a deficit in willed behaviour in schizophrenia is examined, specifically regarding volitional 
and reflexive eye  movements.  Next,  the theoretical  context  is  described by considering a 
popular neurocognitive model of agency in schizophrenia, the comparator model (Blakemore 
et al., 1998).
1.3.1. Empirical evidence: Reflexive and volitional eye movements
One method of measuring agency in schizophrenia is through eye tracking experiments 
comparing  reflexive  to  volitional  saccades.  Saccades  are  eye  movements  typically 
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characterised  by  short  lantencies  (~200ms)  and  brief  durations  (between  20  and  120ms) 
(Gooding & Basso, 2008). Saccades may be classified into two types: fast reflexive, or slower 
volitional. However, fast saccades may not be entirely reflexive, and involve and element of 
volitionality (Hutton, 2008), so reflexive saccades are more accurately described as visually-
guided saccades. 
A long  history of  research  into  saccades  in  schizophrenia  began with  Diefendorf  and 
Dodge in 1908. It is now generally accepted that visually-guided saccades are unimpaired in 
schizophrenia,  but  volitional  saccades  are  slower  (see  Reuter  &  Kathmann,  2004  for  a 
review).
Particularly notable is the antisaccade task, in which subjects fixate on a central point and 
a target appears to the left or to the right. Participants are instructed to not look to the target,  
but  rather  to  look in the opposite  direction.  It  is  thus a task which requires inhibition of 
reflexive movement, as the appearance of a target induces a reflexive saccade which must be 
overridden  by  a  volitional  saccade  in  the  opposite  direction  (Hutton  &  Ettinger,  2006). 
Patients with schizophrenia are  impaired on this  task,  showing more errors than controls, 
which suggests a difficulty in inhibiting reflexive behaviours (Reuter et al., 2007).
The  lack  of  impairment  in  visually-guided  saccades  shows  that  the  slower  volitional 
saccades seen in people with schizophrenia are not due to deficits in muscular movements or 
other limitations of eye movements. Rather,  the volitional aspect specifically seems to be 
impaired in such a way as to make volitional movements slower than reflexive movements 
(Reuter et al., 2007).
In non-clinical populations, high-schizotypy individuals have been shown to make more 
errors on the antisaccade task than controls (Holzman et al., 1995; Gooding, 1999; O'Driscoll 
et al., 1998). Most investigations have found no difference in saccadic latencies on correct 
trials  between high-  and low-schizotypy participants  (Aichert  et  al.,  2012; Brenner  et  al., 
2001;  O'Driscoll  et  al.,  1998).  However,  Thaker  et  al.  (1996)  found  that  relatives  of 
schizophrenics showed longer latencies in antisaccade tasks than controls, but these subjects 
were relatives and not selected for their schizotypy level specifically.
Regarding visually-guided saccade tasks in schizotypy, most studies have found no deficit 
in either latencies or error rates as compared to controls (Aichert et al., 2012; Gooding, 1999; 
Klein et al.,  2000). However, both Larrison et  al.  (2000) and Ettinger et  al.  (2005) found 
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shorter visually-guided saccade latencies in high-schizotypy participants. 
Thus patients with schizophrenia show normal or enhanced visually-guided saccades, but 
impaired volitional and antisaccades. However, it is unclear the degree to which non-clinical 
high-schizotypy people show this same pattern of performance, and there is thus scope to 
further investigate volitional and visually-guided saccades in this thesis.
1.3.2. Theoretical model: The Comparator Model and its limitations
Arguably the  most  influential  neurocognitive model  of  agency in schizophrenia  is  the 
Comparator Model (Blakemore et al., 1998), which posits a process through which sense of 
agency is reduced in schizophrenia. This model proposes that sense of agency arises from a 
comparison between predicted and actual sensory input. Before an action is made, the motor 
system generates a prediction of the sensory consequences of that action. Once the action has 
been made, the prediction is compared to the actual sensory feedback. If the prediction and 
the feedback are a match, then the subject feels themselves to be the agent of the action. In 
schizophrenia,  an  error  in  the  prediction  leads  to  a  mismatch  between  the  two  signals. 
Symptoms such as delusions of control may occur as the actual sensory input of a movement 
does not match the predicted sensory input, so one's actions appear to be externally generated. 
The  model  is  supported  by a  body of  empirical  evidence,  such  as  that  patients  with 
delusions of alien control are less likely to correct errors in a motor task in the absence of 
visual feedback (Frith & Done, 1989), showing that such patients rely on sensory feedback 
more in order to correct errors in movement. Also, schizophrenic people were able to tickle 
themselves  more than  healthy controls  or  other  clinical  groups (Blakemore,  Smith,  Steel, 
Johnstone, & Frith, 2000), suggesting that they are making inaccurate predictions of their own 
movements and hence are surprised by the movements when applied to themselves. Finally, 
patients with schizophrenia found it harder than healthy controls to identify when an image 
was of their hand or the hand of another person (Daprati et al., 1997), showing a difficulty in 
distinguishing between self and other.
This model would predict reduced sense of agency in schizophrenia, as a mismatch in 
predicted  and  actual  feedback  causes  a  loss  of  the  sense  of  agency.  However,  some 
experiments have found an enhanced sense of  agency in schizophrenia,  such as the false 
feedback tasks of Franck et al. (2001). An image of a computer-generated hand is imposed 
over the subject's hand using mirrors, and movements are altered spatially or temporally and 
Page 8
the subject must identify whether the movement seen is their own. Patients tend to identify 
alien hands as belonging to them more often than healthy controls, showing an enhanced 
sense of agency as they are claiming ownership over an object in the world which they cannot 
control. 
Another issue with the comparator model is that it may explain the feeling of agency, but 
is not sufficient to explain the judgement of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008). A difficulty is in 
understanding the  threshold  at  which  a  difference  between predicted  and actual  feedback 
indicates a mismatch - the threshold cannot be very low as subjects still identify movements 
as  their  own when manipulated  spatially (Farrer  et  al.,  2003)  and correctly identify their 
voices when the pitch is changed (Cahill, 1996). At what point is the distinction between self-
produced  and  other-produced  actions  drawn?  Suggestion  of  a  second,  higher-order 
comparator leads to infinite regress. In order to determine what the effects of a movement are, 
the comparator system must already represent which movements are self-caused.
Further, although this model is often invoked to explain first rank symptoms including 
delusions of control and auditory hallucinations, there remain several inconsistencies between 
the theory and empirical findings. One would expect that a failure in the prediction of sensory 
consequences  would  cause  deficits  in  motor  control,  but  motor  control  seems  to  be 
unimpaired in schizophrenia (Waters & Badcock, 2010). Also, the model might explain why a 
patient believes that they are not in control of their actions, but it does not explain why they 
attribute agency to another person (nor why they believe any particular specific person to be 
responsible) (Waters & Badcock, 2010).
The comparator model is an empirically well-supported account of motor intention and 
action.  However,  it  has  some  limitations  as  an  explanation  of  disruptions  of  agency  in 
schizophrenia.  An  amendment  to  the  model  has  been  proposed  in  the  form  of  the 
multifactorial weighting model (Synofzik, 2008;  Vosgerau & Synofzik, 2012), in which the 
comparison of predicted to actual sensory feedback is but one factor of many which is used to  
assess the sense of agency.  Other factors include predicted visual feedback, actual visual 
feedback, and their comparison – here the authors differentiate visual and non-visual sensory 
feedback as distinct agency cues which may be present independently of each other. These 
factors are weighted differently depending upon their past reliability – so a cue with high 
variance would be less reliable, and would thus be weighted lower (Vosgerau & Synofzik, 
2012). In schizophrenia,  as internal predictions about sensory consequences of actions are 
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inaccurate (Synofzik et al., 2010), then visual information (or other posthoc sensory feedback) 
is weighted more strongly in the attribution of agency. In this thesis I address these issues by 
empirically investigating disorders of agency in the schizophrenia spectrum, and considering 
whether the comparator model is a sufficient explanation for these findings.
1.4 Relating disorders of self to disorders of agency
Some previous research has suggested a link between disorders of self and disorders of 
agency. Hauser et  al.  (2011) looked at  the attribution of agency in schizophrenia patients, 
prodromal patients and healthy controls. They also assessed the level of ego disturbances and 
passivity  phenomena  in  both  patient  groups,  and  found  the  over-attribution  of  events  to 
oneself was highly correlated with the presence of passivity phenomena. It seems counter-
intuitive that patients who report  feeling as if someone else controls them would actually 
over-estimate their causal effect on the world.  But the authors suggest that this may be a 
coping mechanism, whereby patients exaggerate their own agency to allay uncertainty about 
agency in ambiguous settings. Further, loss of ego boundaries highly correlated with ability to 
improve performance on agency attribution tasks, which the authors propose could be due to 
an over-reliance on external stimuli to make judgements, because of the uncertainty regarding 
agency that comes with loss of distinction between self and other. 
The convergence of both empirical and theoretical work in cognitive science suggests that 
disorders of self and disorders of agency may be related or share some underlying features.
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1.5. Research Questions and Hypotheses
This thesis addresses the topic of the relationship between disorders of agency and disorders 
of self in the schizophrenia spectrum, involving three aspects:
Question 1 How  can  apparently  contradictory  empirical  findings  regarding 
disorders of agency in schizophrenia be understood?
Aim To review the theoretical background of empirical research into agency.
Question 2 Can the  self  disorder  symptoms typically  found in  schizophrenia  be 
measured reliably in non-clinical populations? If so, are these symptoms 
found in the high-schizotypy population?
Hypotheses High-schizotypy people experience some of the same disorders of self 
which are  seen  in  schizophrenia.  Specifically,  they  are  expected  to  show  
higher levels  of  self  disorder  symptoms  than  low-schizotypy 
people, and the semi-structured  interview  introduced  will 
measure these symptoms reliably.
Question 3 Do  high-schizotypy  people  show  the  same  pattern  of  normal  or 
enhanced  visually-guided  saccades  and  impaired  volitional  saccades  as 
schizophrenic people? 
If so, are these deviances associated with self disorder experiences?
Hypotheses High-schizotypy people are hypothesised to show a similar pattern of 
saccadic  movements  to  schizophrenics:  fast  visually-guided 
saccades are unimpaired or enhanced; slower volitional saccades are 
impaired. Impaired  volitional  saccades  may  be  correlated 
with degree of self disorder.
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2. Methodology
In order to investigate these research questions, a theoretical consideration of the literature 
and two empirical studies were performed. The empirical studies were a reliability study on 
self disorder symptoms and an eye tracking experiment comparing volitional to visually-
guided saccades. The studies used the following methodology:
2.1. Questionnaires and Screening Instruments
2.1.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ)
Schizotypy is measured in these studies using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
(SPQ) (Raine, 1991), a 74-item questionnaire which has been shown to have good reliability 
and consistent underlying factors (Calkins, Curtis, Grove & Iacono, 2004). The SPQ is based 
on Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV) criteria 
for schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) but was 
also designed to measure schizotypal traits in non-clinical groups. It is thus a useful tool for 
investigation of symptoms across the schizophrenia spectrum, from several impaired clinical 
populations to non-clinical groups recruited from the public.
2.1.2. Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE)
The Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) (Parnas et al., 2005) is a tool for 
the assessment  of self  disorder experiences,  using a clinical interview. It  is  a descriptive-
psychopathological  checklist  of  57  well-described  items  for  aspects  of  self  disorder 
experience. All items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0=absent, 1=questionably present, 
2=present[mild],  4=present[moderate],  5=present[severe]).  The items are grouped into five 
theoretically defined domains ("cognition and stream of consciousness", "self-awareness and 
presence", "bodily experiences", "demarcation/transitivism" and "existential reorientation"), 
each comprising a set of  phenomenologically similar symptoms.
2.1.2.1. Modifying the EASE for use in a non-clinical population
The  EASE was  formalised  into  a  semi-structured  interview,  in  which  each  item was 
assigned a question. The questions were open-ended and sought to provoke the participant to 
discuss the experience in question. Questions applied a broad definition of the experience and 
participants were encouraged to discuss their experiences in their own words. Some items had 
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follow-up questions which asked for more specific information if the participant indicated that 
they  were  familiar  with  the  experience  in  question.  The  interviews  were  conducted  in 
German. For a list of questions used in the interview translated into English, see paper 2, 
Appendix.
The interviews were performed by three interviewers, who were advanced Psychology 
students with experience in a clinical setting. They were extensively trained on the EASE 
(around 30 hours of training total), including understanding the underlying phenomenological 
constructs of each item, building rapport with participants, and interpreting the descriptions of 
the participants. 
Interviews were video taped, and once interviews were completed, the rating took place. 
The rating was performed by the interviewer and an independent second rater, who watched 
the  videotaped  interviewer  and  rated  each  item.  The  second  rater  was  another  of  the 
interviewers who did not have access to the participant or to the original interviewer's notes. 
In addition, both the interviewer and the second rater were blind to the schizotypy score. 
2.1.3. Other Assessment Instruments
Participants were checked for diagnoses of mental disorders using the German version 
(Wittchen, Zaudig, & Fydrich, 1997) of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID 
I) (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon & First, 1994). A demographic data questionnaire of our own 
design  was  used  to  assess  age,  gender,  first  language,  educational  information,  current 
employment, a history of neurological and psychiatric treatment, handedness, and drug and 
alcohol use.
2.2. Participants
We began with an internet screening of schizotypy in a large sample using the SPQ. The 
internet screening was advertised on mailing lists for students at the Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin  and the  Freie  Universität  Berlin,  in  a  local  newspaper,  and on a  public  classified 
advertisements board. A total of 1296 participants completed the online survey, of which 428 
were discarded from further analysis  due to not having completed all  questions, and SPQ 
scores for the remaining participants were then calculated. Of the remaining 868 participants, 
those who scored above the 90th percentile cut-off of SPQ score (≥41; N=129) or below the 
10th  percentile  cut-off  of  SPQ  score  (≤7;  N=145)  were  assigned  to  the  high-  and  low-
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schizotypy groups, respectively. 
Randomly selected participants from the high- (N=30) and low-schizotypy (N=20) groups 
were invited to take part  in  an experimental session at  the Psychology department  of the 
Humboldt-Universität in Adlershof. Participants with history of head injury or neurological 
conditions, as assessed through self report, were excluded from the experimental session. The 
demographic  data  for  the final  groups was as  follows:  the high-schizotypy group had 23 
female and 7 male participants, mean age 27.5 (SD=6.6) and mean 12.8 years in education 
(SD=1.7). The low-schizotypy group had 14 female and 6 male participants, mean age 32.7 
(SD=11.0) and mean 12.6 years in education (SD=0.92). The larger high-schizotypy group 
was due to a desire to use this data for further analysis, as we expected greater variance of 
EASE score in this group.
2.3. Experimental Procedure
Participants  were  invited  through  email  and  telephone  communication  to  attend  an 
assessment  session  at  the  Institute  for  Psychology,  Humboldt-Universität  zu  Berlin.  After 
being informed about the conditions and aims of the study, participants completed the self-
report  questionnaires.  The  participants  were  then  interviewed  using  the  modified  EASE 
interview, typically lasting 1.5 to 3 hours. The interviews were video recorded for later rating.  
Next, the SCID interview was conducted, and afterwards the participants took part in an eye 
tracking experiment.
2.3.1. Eye Tracking set-up
2.3.1.1. Apparatus
Participants sat  in an eye tracking cabin in front  of a monitor  on which the task was 
presented. The lighting was kept at a low level and a chin rest and foot rest were used to 
reduce body movements.  The 17 inch monitor  was 20 inches  away from the eyes  of the 
participants.  Stimuli  were  presented  using  Presentation  version  16.3  (Neurobehavioural 
Systems, Inc) and recorded using the EyeLink system version 2.22 (SR Research).
2.3.1.2. Procedure
Blocks began with instructions presented on the screen, and in addition, the experimenter 
explained the conditions verbally. Each block consisted of 10 practice trials, followed by 40 
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actual trials. Each trial began with the participant fixating on a central  cross. After 1000-
2000ms (randomised per trial), a symbol was changed on screen to signal that the participant 
should execute an eye movement to the left or to the right. The symbols used and the direction 
of eye movement required differed for each block (see section 2.3.1.3). On half of trials the 
target for the eye movement was on the left, and on the other half it was on the right. Stimuli 
were presented in white on a black background. Blocks were presented in a counter-balanced 
order.
2.3.1.3. Experimental task
The experiment included seven different eye movement conditions, as follows (illustrated 
in Figure 1). Cued and uncued simple volitional saccades involved a target on either the left or 
right side, and a change in central stimulus, which indicated the direction in which the eye 
movement  should  be directed.  In  the cued condition,  the direction  of  the instruction  was 
indicated before the change took place, but not in the uncued condition. The cued and uncued 
conditions serve to distinguish subcomponents of response selection and initiation, based on 
previous empirical findings that people with schizophrenia are impaired on saccade initiation 
specifically  (Reuter  et  al.,  2007).  Cued  and  uncued  visually-guided  saccades  were  also 
investigated, which were similar to the simple volitional saccades, except that there was also a 
change in the target stimulus at the time of central change. An antisaccade task was included 
in  which  the  participants  were  instructed  to  execute  an  eye  movement  in  the  opposite 
direction to the target. 
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Figure 1:  Representation of the task conditions (adapted from Kloft et al., 
2013, with permission)
It was also considered whether experiences of volition would be effected by different sensory 
modalities, and to this end performance on tasks where the signal to execute a saccade was 
given  by  an  auditory  tone  was  examined.  In  one  condition,  the  tone  was  presented 
simultaneously with the central  change of the symbol.  In another,  the tone was presented 
alone, without a central change.
2.4. Statistical analysis
Data was analysed using SPSS 19 (IBM Corp, Armonk, NY), SR Research Data Viewer 
1.10 (SR Research) and MedCalc (MedCalc software, Ostend, Belgium). 
Inter-rater reliability for the interview was calculated using a quadratically weighted kappa 
score  for  the  pair  of  ratings  for  each  individual  item.  Kappa  score  corrects  for  chance 
agreement and takes frequency into account (Sim & Wright, 2005), making it a commonly 
used method for assessing agreement between raters. A weighted kappa statistic was most 
appropriate for measuring inter-rater reliability as the rating scale is ordinal in nature (Fleiss 
& Cohen, 1973; Stemler, 2004). We used a quadratic weighting as this can be interpreted as 
an intraclass correlation coefficient (Brenner & Kliebsch, 1996; Schuster, 2004). A general 
estimation  of  reliability  was  calculated  by  averaging  individual  kappa  scores  for  each 
interviewee.
Participants who did not complete the eye tracking experiment (N=4), who had incomplete 
data  (N=15)  or  fewer  than  5  valid  trials  on  each  block  (N=5)  were  excluded.  The  final 
remaining groups were 13 high-SPQ and 13 low-SPQ participants. Trials were excluded for 
meeting any of the following criteria: 1) no saccade occurred within the time window (starting 
800ms before the start signal with a duration of 1200ms), 2) the subject did not fixate in the 
centre from 800ms onwards, 3) a blink occurred between 800 and 1000ms, 4) any recording 
gaps larger than 150ms occurred, 5) the saccade occurred between 200ms before and 80ms 
after the start signal (classified as anticipatory saccades).
The median latency of correct saccades was determined for each subject in each of the 
seven conditions. A one-way ANOVA was conducted comparing the effect of group (high 
versus low schizotypy), cue (cued versus uncued conditions), and volition (volitional versus 
visually-guided  conditions)  on  saccade  latencies  in  the  five  main  conditions.  Cases  were 
excluded listwise.  Posthoc t-tests  were performed to test  specific hypotheses.  Correlations 
between EASE score and latencies were investigated using a bivariate correlation to find the 
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Pearson product-moment correlation. Correlations were investigated in the high-schizotypy 
group only, as there was large variance of EASE in the high group (M=59.46, SD=32.71) but 
not in the low group (M=12.46, SD=12.38).
Page 18
3. Summary of Theoretical Paper and Experimental Studies
This chapter will briefly summarise the three papers which comprise this thesis. The first 
paper is a theoretical analysis and review of empirical methods for measuring agency, the 
second  is  a  reliability  study for  a  phenomenologically-based  interview for  assessing  self 
disorders, and the third is a study into volitional and visually-guided saccades among high-
schizotypy people. The complete papers can be found in section 6.
3.1. Paper 1: Experimental Methods of Measuring Agency: Conceptual 
aspects and implications for psychopathology research
As yet,  there  is  no  consensus  regarding  how agency can  be  measured  empirically.  A 
number of different paradigms to investigate agency are available in the literature, but no one 
is accepted as standard.  For the sake of further research,  it  was beneficial to assess these 
paradigms and the aspects of agency which they measure. A summary of paradigms used in 
the literature is  presented in  Table 1,  including a  brief  description of  each paradigm, the 
findings  of  the  paradigm  in  people  with  schizophrenia  (where  such  investigations  were 
performed), a notation of whether these findings indicate an enhanced or reduced sense of 
agency in schizophrenia,  and an indication of the aspect of agency which each paradigm 
measures. 
This  allows  comparison of  the  relationship  between  the  aspects  of  agency which  are 
measured  and  the  paradigm's  findings.  Most  studies  which  found  enhanced  agency  in 
schizophrenia used paradigms which measure judgements of agency. Studies which found 
reduced agency in schizophrenia typically used paradigms which measured other aspects of 
agency,  such as  self  versus  other  judgements,  judgements  of  causation,  or  judgements  of 
ownership. This demonstrates that the current theoretical conception of schizophrenia patients 
experiencing only a reduction in agency in insufficient to explain all the available empirical 
evidence. Schizophrenia patients also show enhanced agency on certain paradigms, depending 
upon which aspect of agency the paradigm measures.
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Table 1: a summary of experimental paradigms used to measure agency
Paradigm 
type Authors Brief description
Findings in schizophrenia
(where investigated)
Agency in 
schizo-
phrenia
Type of agency
False 
feedback
Nielsen 1963; 
Sørensen 2005 Inducing alien hand experiences   -   -
Feeling of 
agency
Fourneret & 
Jeannerod 
1998
Subjects drew a line, mirrors used 
to make it appear distorted   -   -
Feeling of 
agency
Computer-
ised false 
feedback
Franck et al. 
2001
Subject move joystick, visual 
feedback is distorted, asked if 
movement is theirs
Patients claimed ownership 
in more extreme temporal 
deviations than controls
Enhanced Judgement of agency
Nahab et al. 
2011
Virtual hand, manipulated the 
degree to which participants had 
control
  -   - Judgement of agency
Asai and Tanno 
2007
Subject control cursor on a screen, 
movements are manipulated 
spatially or temporally
High-schizotypy had weaker 
sense of self agency on 
spatially distorted trials
Reduced Judgement of causation
Hauser et al. 
2011
Participant drummed; heard 
faithful or manipulated audio of 
their playing
Patients claimed agency 
over sounds even when they 
were computer generated
Enhanced Judgement of causation
Agency 
judgement 
with priming
Aarts et al. 2005
Primed wheel of fortune game, 
participants had to judge whether a 
square was selected by them or by 
the computer
  -   - Judgement of agency
Gentsch et al. 
2012
Button press was concordant or not 
with information on screen, 
participants judged how strong the 
casual link between button and 
screen
  -   - Judgement of causation
Damen, Baaren 
& Dijksterhuis 
2014
Pushed buttons which produced 
tones, sometimes primed, asked 
the degree to which they caused 
the tones
  -   - Judgement of causation
Intentional 
binding
Haggard, Clark 
and Kalogeras 
2002
Judgement of elapsed time 
between button press and tone
Patients show stronger 
binding Enhanced
FoA / 
judgement of 
causation
Voss et al. 2010 As above, but modified probability of tone
Patients over-rely on sensory 
feedback Enhanced
Feeling of agency / 
judgement of 
causation
Moore et al. 
2013
Watched videos of another's 
push/tone, estimated time elapsed
Healthy subjects differed in 
estimates when video is 
same, but described as 
intentional
  - Judgement of other causation
Self 
recognition
van den Bos & 
Jeannerod 
2002; 
Jeannerod et al. 
2003
Participant and experimenter have 
gloved hands and make 
movements. These images are 
manipulated, participants are asked 
if hand was theirs
Patients with hallucinations 
or delusions of control 
showed more errors, 
mistook the experimenter's 
hand for theirs
Reduced Judgement of ownership
Blakemore et 
al. 2000
Can you tickle yourself? Subjects 
produce movements which are 
relayed back to them by machine, 
they rate sensations of ticklishness 
and surprise
Patients found their own 
movements as ticklish as 
movements produced by 
others
Reduced Feeling of ownership
Van Doorn, 
Hohwy & 
Symmons 2014
Used body transfer illusions in 
tickle paradigm above   -   -
Feeling of 
ownership
Action 
ownership
Wegner &  
Wheatley 1995
Participant & confederate share 
trackball used to select an image   -   -
Judgement 
causation
Metcalfe et al. Inputs to a computer were Patients rated their Enhanced Judgement 
Page 20
2012
distorted by noise, participants 
were asked about their sense of 
agency and accuracy
accuracy lower on 
distorted trials but not their 
agency
of agency
3.2. Paper 2: Reliability of Measuring Self Disorders in a Non-clinical 
Population
Self disorder symptoms are well-recognised in phenomenological psychiatry research, and 
have  been  suggested  as  paradigmatic  of  the  schizophrenic  experience  (Simms,  1991). 
However,  there  is  a  paucity  of  knowledge  about  the  biological  and  psychological 
underpinnings of these symptoms. Recently, renewed interest in phenomenological methods 
have lead to the creation of tools for the differentiated assessment of self disorders, designed 
for  use  among  the  clinical  schizophrenic  population.  One  such  tool,  the  Examination  of 
Anomalous  Self-Experience  (EASE)  checklist  (Parnas  et  al.,  2005),  aims  to  assess  self 
disorder symptoms through a clinical interview and rating of items on a descriptive checklist 
of psychopathological experiences. This tool was developed for use in clinical settings, and 
we adapted it for use among non-clinical populations.
We aimed to explore whether anomalies of self occurred in the non-clinical population, 
and further, whether these anomalies could be measured reliably. We used a semi-structured 
interview technique to assess the prevalence of self disorder symptoms in groups of high- and 
low-schizotypy participants. Interviews were video taped and rated by two independent raters, 
and the inter-rater reliability was calculated. 
All  items  showed  good  reliability,  scoring  a  kappa  above  0.5.  According  to  the 
classification of Landis & Koch (1977), six of the items showed moderate agreement (kappa 
between 0.41 and 0.60), 44 items showed substantial  agreement (kappa between 0.61 and 
0.80) and 22 items showed almost perfect agreement (kappa between 0.80 and 1.00). The 
mean kappa score for all EASE items was 0.76, showing substantial agreement between raters 
for the score for the whole interview. Internal consistency for the whole scale was found to be 
excellent  (α=0.95).  The  average  inter-item correlation  for  the  whole  scale  was  moderate 
(r=0.27). 
As expected, the high-schizotypy group scored significantly higher (M=63.27, SD=35.97) 
than  the  low-schizotypy group  (M=11.75,  SD=10.58)  on  the  EASE scale  (t(36.10)=7.30, 
p<0.01). There were nine symptoms which were at least mildly present in at least 50% of the 
high-schizotypy group.
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3.3. Paper 3: Volitional and Visually-guided Saccades in Non-clinical 
Schizotypical Populations
Saccadic eye movements are known to be disturbed in schizophrenia. Fast visually-guided 
saccades are unimpaired, but slower volitional saccades show longer latencies among people 
with  schizophrenia  (Reuter  &  Kathmann,  2004).  Schizophrenia  patients  also  make  more 
errors on the antisaccade task, in which participants must look in the opposite direction to 
which a target appears (Sereno & Holzman, 1995). 
There is some evidence that these deficits can be found in non-clinical high-schizotypy 
people  as  well  as  people  with  schizophrenia.  Most  studies  have  found  no  difference  in 
saccadic latencies on visually-guided saccades between high- and low-schizotypy participants 
(Aichert  et  al.,  2012;   Brenner  et  al.,  2001;  O'Driscoll  et  al.,  1998),  but  high-schizotypy 
individuals  do  make  more  errors  on  the  antisaccade  task  than  controls  (Gooding,  1999; 
Holzman et al., 1995; O'Driscoll et al., 1998). 
We aimed to  investigate  whether  non-clinical  high-schizotypy individuals  showed this 
same impairment of volitional saccades, particularly by comparing simple volitional saccades 
to  visually-guided saccades,  which  had not  previously been examined empirically in  this 
group. Further, we aimed to investigate whether impairment on saccade tasks was associated 
with self disorder experiences as measured by the EASE. To this end, we recruited high- and 
low-schizotypy individuals (see section 2.2) and invited them to take part in an experimental 
eye tracking session. The experiment included seven different eye movement conditions (see 
section 2.3.1.3). 
The median latency of correct  saccades  was determined for each subject in the seven 
conditions.  No  significant  differences  were  found  in  latencies  between  high-  and  low-
schizotypy groups in any condition. However, between-group latencies of antisaccades were 
in the expected direction and showed medium effect sizes, t(24)=1.28, p=0.21, d=0.50, with 
high-schizotypy subjects showing a trend for  faster  latencies  (M=262.92, SD=51.68)  than 
low-schizotypy subjects (M=285.38, SD=36.76).
In the high-schizotypy group (N=13),  there was a strong negative correlation between 
EASE score and latencies for cued visually-guided saccades,  r(11)=-0.66,  p=0.02, and for 
uncued visually-guided saccades, r(11)=-0.70, p=0.01. Correlations were also found in the 
high-  and  low-  schizotypy  groups  combined  (N=26)  for  cued  visually-guided  saccades, 
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r(24)=-0.51,  p=0.01,  and  uncued  visually-guided  saccades,  r(24)=-0.42,  p=0.03.  Other 
correlations between EASE and latencies, or between SPQ and latencies, were not significant. 
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4. Discussion and future directions
Based on the introduction and the data from the thesis, a discussion of the relevant 
findings and issues is presented here. A model of the disruption of agency and self in 
schizophrenia is presented.
4.1. Addressing the research questions
4.1.1. Paper 1: Agency
4.1.1.1. Paradigms for measuring agency
Research question What paradigms are used for measuring agency? Which aspect  
of 
agency does each involve?
The field of agency research has produced a large number of innovative paradigms for 
measuring the degree to which a participant feels in control of an action. This research has 
often focused on patients with schizophrenia, as disrupted sense of agency is demonstrated in 
schizophrenia  symptoms  such  as  delusions  of  control.  This  paper  examined  the  various 
experimental paradigms in use in the field; a brief overview of which is presented in Table 1 
(see section 3.1).
4.1.1.2. Agency in schizophrenia
Research question: How can apparently contradictory empirical findings regarding 
disorders of agency in schizophrenia be understood?
Rather disparate results have emerged when investigating experiences of agency among 
people  with schizophrenia.  The comparator  model,  a  prominent  neurocognitive model  of 
schizophrenia (Blakemore et al., 1998), implies that schizophrenics would show a decreased 
sense of agency (see section 1.3.2). However, some experiments have found that people with 
schizophrenia actually show an enhanced or increased sense of agency – that is, that they are 
more likely to claim ownership over ambiguously-caused events than healthy people. In false 
feedback paradigms, for example, participants make hand movements but the visual feedback 
they  see  is  manipulated  to  appear  different.  Feedback  may  be  manipulated  spatially  or 
temporally, so that the image of their hand that they see is moving at a different angle or 
speed from their actual movements. People with schizophrenia are more likely to claim the 
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hand with the distorted feedback as their  own that healthy people,  showing an enhanced 
rather than reduced sense of agency (Franck et al., 2001).
Other paradigms have also found enhanced sense of agency in schizophrenia, such as the 
intentional binding paradigm (Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras, 2002). This implicit measure of 
agency leverages the temporal binding which healthy participants show between cause and 
effect,  which  people  with  schizophrenia  show  more  strongly.  Also  relevant  are  self-
recognition paradigms (van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002), where participants are presented 
with  images  of  their  gloved  hands  performing  a  movement  next  to  images  of  an 
experimenter's gloved hand performing the same movements, and the subject must indicate 
which hand is theirs. People with schizophrenia make more errors on this task, demonstrating 
a willingness to claim agency over actions which were not initiated by them.
The discrepancies between the comparator model and these experimental findings may be 
explained by examining the weighting of cues used in assessing agency. Both predictions 
about  the  outcome  of  actions  (i.e.,  intentions)  and  posthoc  information  about  the  actual 
consequences  of  actions  (i.e.,  sensory  feedback)  are  important  in  forming  the  sense  of 
agency. In schizophrenia, predictions about the consequences of actions are inaccurate, and 
so sensory feedback may be weighted more strongly than intentions in  the attribution of 
agency (Synofzik et al., 2010). Schizophrenic patients rely more on visual information than 
on prior  mental  states  or  intentions  to  determine  agency.  This  “sensory-driven-ness” can 
explain why some experimental paradigms find enhanced agency and some reduced: cues for 
agency are weighted depending upon their reliability, and people with schizophrenia have 
inaccurate and therefore unreliable predictions about the outcomes of their actions. Therefore 
in cases where the predicted outcomes of actions are unreliable, posthoc sensory stimuli are 
weighted more heavily in agency judgements. This leads to enhanced agency in paradigms 
where posthoc cues imply that the subject is the agent, and reduced agency in paradigms 
where the posthoc cues do not imply this.
4.1.2. Paper 2: Self disorders
4.1.2.1. Measuring disorders of self empirically
Research question: Can self disorder symptoms typically found in schizophrenia be 
measured reliably in non-clinical populations?
We  adapted  the  phenomenologically-based  EASE  checklist  into  a  semi-structured 
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interview for use in non-clinical populations and tested its reliability. The kappa scores for the 
interview were  high,  showing  good inter-rater  reliability.  The  kappa scores  presented  are 
comparable to values found in reliability studies of both schizophrenia (Norgaard & Parnas, 
2012)  and  first-admission  psychosis  patients  (Møller  et  al.,  2011).  Good  reliability  was 
achieved through formalising the EASE into a semi-structured interview with set questions, 
extensive interviewer training, and a clearly described rating guide. 
The  results  show  that  the  ratings  of  the  general  extent  of  self  disorder  symptoms, 
operationalised  by  the  EASE  total  score,  and  on  a  substantial  number  of  single  items 
representing specific symptoms, achieve almost perfect inter-rater reliability. The inter-rater 
reliability of more than 90% of single items can be considered substantial according to Landis 
and Koch's (1977) interpretation of magnitude. 
This study demonstrates the feasibility of reliably measuring self disorder symptoms in a non-
clinical population. It addresses the lack of such a tool in the current literature, enabling the 
measurement of such symptoms in empirical studies.
4.1.2.2. Self disorder symptoms in the non-clinical high-schizotypy population
Research question: Are the self disorder symptoms typically found in schizophrenia  
also 
found in the non-clinical high-schizotypy population?
High-schizotypy participants scored significantly higher in self disorder symptoms than 
low-schizotypy  participants.  There  were  nine  items  on  which  at  least  half  of  the  high-
schizotypy  group  scored  at  least  mildly  present.  Self  disorder  symptoms  are  considered 
paradigmatic of schizophrenia (Simms, 1991), and empirical studies have found higher rates 
of such symptoms in schizophrenia patients than other psychiatric patients and non-clinical 
controls (Moe & Docherty, 2014).  Hence the prevalence of self disorder symptoms in this 
non-clinical population is remarkable, given that none of the participants were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia  or  other  psychotic  disorder.  The  mean  EASE score  in  the  high-schizotypy 
group  of  63.27  is  approaching  the  scores  found  in  patients  with  clinical  schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders, such as a study of first episode psychosis patients which found a mean 
EASE score of 73.50 (Nelson et al., 2012). The findings of self disorder symptoms among 
non-clinical populations as well as patients is in line with evidence for the continuum model 
of psychosis (van Os et al., 1999). 
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This  methodology has  captured  data  on a  specific  set  of  self  disorder  symptoms in a 
systematic  way.  One  limitation  is  regarding  the  delineation  of  self  disorder  symptoms 
themselves.  Self  disorder  refers  to  a  broad  range  of  experiences,  including  unusual 
experiences of cognition, bodily sensations and presence. Hence the EASE checklist is a list 
of familiar  and related experiences rather than an absolutely demarked symptom set.  The 
inclusion or not of any particular symptom is debatable - anxiety, for example, appears in the 
EASE, but is not unambiguously a symptom relating to the self as such. However, this is a 
limitation  of  such  checklist-based  tools  generally.  This  sample  was  not  large  enough  to 
adequately investigate a factor structure, but a larger-scale study could examine whether there 
is a consistent underlying factor structure of self disorder symptoms.
Further,  an association between schizotypy and anomalies of self-experience would be 
expected, as the two constructs overlap to some extent. The definition of high-schizotypy, 
which  is  captured  by  the  SPQ  (see  section  2.1.1),  includes  a  number  of  self  disorder 
symptoms, especially in its subscales “ideas of reference”, “odd beliefs or magical thinking” 
(e.g., experience of thought broadcast), and “unusual perceptual experiences” (e.g., mirror-
related confusion phenomena). However, it was not previously clear the extent to which self 
disorder symptoms would be self-reported by non-clinical high-schizotypy people.
Of the nine symptoms which were at least mildly present in at least 50% of the high-
schizotypy group,  all  items  were  from the  two EASE domains  “cognition  and stream of 
consciousness”  and  “self-awareness  and  presence”.  Notably,  none  of  the  symptoms  in 
question directly refers to defining traits of schizotypy as defined in the SPQ. Three of the 
symptoms, thought block, thought pressure, and thought interference, belong to the “formal 
thought  disorders”  of  schizophrenia  (Waters  &  Badcock,  2010),  but  are  not  explicit 
characteristics of schizotypy. These data show that the EASE can be useful to specify the 
exact nature of such cognitive abnormalities in high-schizotypy populations.
Another  symptom  with  a  substantial  prevalence  in  the  high-schizotypy  group  was 
hyperreflectivity.  Hyperreflectivity,  or  excessive  self-monitoring,  is  a  subset  of  the 
exaggerated self-consciousness of hyperreflexivity from the Ipseity-Hyperreflexivity Model 
(IHM) (Parnas,  Sass  & Zahavi,  2008)  (see  section  1.2.1.2,  and see Sass  et  al.,  2013 for 
discussion of the relation between hyperreflexivity and hyperreflectivity).  Hyperreflexivity 
describes the experience of excessively attending to and analysing the normal processes of the 
body  and  mind,  and  has  also  not  been  considered  a  symptom  of  schizotypy  so  far.  Its 
Page 28
substantial prevalence in the high-schizotypy group is evidence of anomalous self-experience 
that  goes  beyond the  defining  traits  of  the schizotypy concept  and resembles  phenomena 
observed in patients with schizophrenia.  
4.1.3. Paper 3: Eye tracking
4.1.3.1. Saccadic eye movements in high-schizotypy individuals
Research question: Do high-schizotypy people show the same pattern of normal or  
enhanced  visually-guided  saccades  and  impaired  volitional  
saccades as schizophrenic people?
This pilot study sought to investigate the relationship between two psychological factors 
(schizotypy and self  disorders)  and two  types  of  saccadic  eye  movement  (volitional  and 
visually-guided).  It  is  established  in  the  literature  that  people  with  schizophrenia  have 
unimpaired visually-guided saccades but impaired volitional saccades (Reuter & Kathmann, 
2004), suggesting that there is not a deficit in reaction time to stimuli, in muscular responses, 
or in the focusing or repositioning of the eye. The slower volitional saccades suggest that it is 
the generation and/or  execution of a  willed action that  is  impaired in schizophrenia.  This 
study investigated  whether  this  pattern  of  performance would  hold  for  non-clinical  high-
schizotypy people. 
The varying types of saccadic eye movement we investigated represent different levels of 
volitional or agentic experience. A visually-guided saccade is a stimulus-driven, somewhat 
automatic  reaction  to  a  change in  environment,  and can  thus  be  understood as  primarily 
reflexive. A simple volitional saccade is self-initiated and agentic, and so is best understood as 
volitional. The antisaccade task requires the inhibition of a reflexive movement by a volitional 
one. 
No significant  differences  in  latencies  of  either  visually-guided  or  volitional  saccades 
between high- and low-schizotypy groups were found, which is in line with previous findings 
in schizotypical populations (Gooding, 1999; Klein et al., 2000). This study expanded upon 
these results by comparing simple volitional saccade and visually-guided saccade conditions, 
which had not previously been investigated in schizotypical people. These simple volitional 
saccades  were  also  found  to  be  unimpaired  in  schizotypical  people,  unlike  people  with 
schizophrenia who are typically impaired on this task (Reuter & Kathmann, 2004). 
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4.1.3.2. Disturbed eye movements and self disorders
Research question: If unusual eye movements are found among high-schizotypy 
individuals, are these deviances associated with self disorder 
experiences?
A strong  negative  correlation  between  latencies  for  visually-guided  saccades  and  self 
disorder scores was found. This shows that people with high levels of self disorders respond 
faster to changes in the visual environment than people without self disorders, which may 
indicate that they are more receptive to or influenced by events in the outside world. This 
relationship between self disorder symptoms and anomalies of agency will be considered in 
the following section (4.2).
4.2. Model of disruptions of self and agency in schizophrenia
The findings previously discussed may be best understood by considering the roles and 
limitations of two models of schizophrenia: the comparator model (CM) (Blakemore et al., 
1998) and the ipseity-hyperreflexivity model (IHM) (Parnas, Sass & Zahavi, 2008). The CM 
is a neurocognitive account of sensorimotor control, which purports to explain the sense of 
agency and its disruption in schizophrenia. The IHM is a phenomenologically-based model of 
the disturbance of self in schizophrenia. These two models are brought together by this thesis 
in general, and the concept of stimulus-driven-ness in particular.
The  theoretical  paper  of  this  thesis  (paper  1)  describes  agency  as  arising  from  the 
integration of both predictions about the consequences of an action (internally generated, prior 
to action) and sensory feedback after the action (external, posthoc). The CM posits that it is 
the comparison of these predicted and actual sensory feedback cues that results in sense of 
agency. However, this  account does not adequately explain some experimental findings in 
schizophrenia,  such  as  the  enhanced  sense  of  agency over  spatially-distorted  movements 
compared to controls (Franck et al., 2001). Following the multifactorial weighting conception 
(Synofzik, 2008), this paper proposed that such discrepancies may be explained by multiple 
agency cues which are weighted based on their reliability. These cues include but are not 
limited to the comparison of predicted to actual sensory consequences. Other cues may be 
integrated in the case of ambiguity – for example, if visual and non-visual sensory feedback 
are contradictory, then each cue is weighted in the degree to which it contributes to the sense 
of agency. In schizophrenia, internal cue information is more ambiguous and so less reliable, 
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so visual information (or other posthoc sensory feedback) is weighted more strongly in the 
attribution of agency. 
The IHM posits that central to the experience of self disorders in schizophrenia are two 
aspects: hyperreflexivity, or excessive self-awareness, and disturbance in ipseity, i.e. the sense 
of  mine-ness  which  is  implicit  in  all  our  actions.  Given  the  nature  of  the  schizophrenia 
spectrum, it would be expected that such experiences may also be found in people high in 
schizotypy. The self disorder study (paper 2) was a demonstration that such phenomenological 
models can be operationalised empirically. It was also an investigation of the prevalence of 
self disorder symptoms among this non-clinical group. It found evidence of a high prevalence 
of  a  number  of  self  disorder  symptoms  among  high-schizotypy  people,  including 
hyperreflectivity, a subset of hyperreflexivity.
The eye tracking study presented here (paper 3) demonstrates a link between self disorder 
symptoms and faster reaction times to changes in the visual field. The negative correlation 
between self disorder score and latencies for visually-guided saccades is evidence supporting 
a greater weighting and increased prominence of external cues over internal mental states in 
schizophrenia spectrum conditions. This is the first time that a link between self disorders and 
performance on eye movement tasks has been demonstrated in the literature, and from this a 
model of schizophrenia spectrum conditions can be constructed (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 presents a model of disorders of self and agency in schizophrenia, combining the 
IHM and the CM with the concept of stimulus-driven-ness. The experience of self disorder 
symptoms in the IHM leads to a dissolution of the boundary between self and world, which is 
in turn leads to changes in the world having a greater effect on cognition. This prominence of 
external events in turn promotes and maintains self disorder symptoms through abnormalities 
of experience such as aberrant salience. This same stimulus-driven-ness effects the CM, as 
sensory feedback cues are more reliable than predictive cues and hence are weighted more 
heavily.
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This model extends the CM in support of the multifactorial weighting model (Synofzik, 
2008) by positing that predictions and sensory data are not just compared by a comparator, but 
added together in some kind of integration process. Moore & Haggard (2008) suggest that this 
integration  process  may  be  Bayesian  in  nature,  weighting  prior  information  against 
retrospective  information  based  upon  its  reliability,  in  order  to  minimize  uncertainty.  In 
schizophrenia, a faulty prediction mechanism means that the prior is weak and unreliable, and 
so  sense  of  agency  relies  more  heavily  upon  other  cues  such  as  retrospective  sensory 
feedback. 
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Figure 2: Depiction of the relationship between the Ipseity-Hyperreflexivity Model and the 
Comparator Model in schizophrenia
The  weighting  of  information  in  a  Bayesian  manner  is  supported  by  evidence  from 
computational models (Hindriks et al., 2011), which distinguish assessments of causality (i.e., 
judgements  of  agency)  from  the  feeling  of  doing  (i.e.,  feeling  of  agency).  Truer  (2011) 
attempts to apply a computational model to schizophrenia which differentiate between prior 
and retrospective ownership states.  But this model found that a low predictive component 
would  also  lead  to  low  retrospective  component  and  therefore  reduced  sense  of  agency. 
However, this was only true for a low threshold of prediction components: i.e. that very poor 
prediction implies no self-ownership. Hence there are suggestions that this mechanism may be 
understood computationally, however the exact nature of the weighting process remains an 
open question.
This model, whereby due to previous unreliability, internal prediction cues are weighted 
less  than  retrospective  sensory  data  cues,  can  help  explain  other  empirical  findings  in 
schizophrenia.  For example,  people with schizophrenia are more susceptible to the rubber 
hand illusion (Costantini & Haggard, 2007), in that they experience ownership over the rubber 
hand faster than healthy controls –  the rubber hand appears in the correct visual position 
relative to the body and so it  is accepted as belonging to them. Here proprioceptive cues 
regarding the actual position of one's limbs are weighted less than visual feedback cues that 
the rubber hand is in the place of the one's own hand. Patients with schizophrenia are more 
susceptible to the illusion than controls because their sense of agency is based more upon the 
visual  feedback which suggests that  the rubber  hand is  their  own,  than upon the internal 
monitoring of bodily position which suggests that the rubber hand is not their own. 
This can also explain experimental findings of reduced agency in schizophrenia, such as 
the finding that schizophrenic subjects can tickle themselves more effectively than healthy 
controls (Blakemore et al., 2000). The participants make movements which are then relayed 
back to them by a machine, and healthy people recognise their own movements and so do not 
experience them as surprising or ticklish. People with schizophrenia, however, do find the 
movements ticklish, suggesting that they experience the self-produced movements as other-
produced,  showing  loss  of  agency  over  their  own  movements.  That  is,  patients  with 
schizophrenia find their own-produced actions ticklish because they do not accurately predict 
their sensory consequences. In healthy subjects, self-produced stimuli are experienced as less 
intense because they are predicted, and therefore their sensory consequences are attenuated. 
But in schizophrenia patients, unreliable internal cues preclude this sensory attenuation so that 
even self-produced actions seem salient and surprising. Other schizophrenia symptoms such 
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as delusions of control may also be explained, as a patient's own actions could be experienced 
as other-produced because the sensory consequences of those actions are unexpected. When, 
in previous situations, information about one's own internal states has proven unreliable, these 
internal cues will be weighted lower than more robust cues such as visual feedback, which 
can create a susceptibility to illusions and from there the development of delusions.
Unreliable sensory predictions in schizophrenia thus lead to an over-weighting of sensory 
information which can be termed “stimulus-driven-ness”, related to both ipseity disturbance 
and  hyperreflexivity  of  the  IHM.  Excessive  attention  to  external  events  encourages  a 
diminution of self and hence a loss of the “mineness” of experience (loss of ipseity).  This 
insecurity in existential self leads to excessive monitoring of bodily sensations and mental 
experiences  (hyperreflexivity)  in  an  attempt  to  protect  the  self  from the  intrusion  of  the 
outside world. This conception is supported by the work of Hauser et al. (2011), who found 
that loss of ego boundaries highly correlated with ability to improve performance on agency 
attribution tasks. The authors propose that this unusual performance improvement is due to an 
over-reliance  on  external  stimuli  to  make  judgements  –  because  people  with  unclear 
distinction between self and other rely more on sensory information than prior intentions to 
identify the agent of an action. This concords with the model presented above; with external 
stimuli  being more  reliable  to  people  with schizophrenia and therefore  weighted  more in 
assessing agency.
The hyperreflexivity and loss of ipseity of the IHM may be conceived as a disturbance in 
both agency and self; exaggerated self-consciousness leading to insecurity over both one's 
actions and one's capacity to perform actions. We found a connection between self disorder 
symptoms  and  reacting  faster  to  changes  in  the  external  world,  supporting  this  view. 
Disruptions of self and agency are intertwined: the feeling of being a unified self and the 
feeling  of  controlling  your  body  and  its  actions  are  mutually  supportive.  Internal  states 
become unreliable when one lacks a firm experience of self; it is this instability of self which 
may give rise to the many disparate symptoms of schizophrenia. 
4.3. Limitations and implications for future research
Some limitations of the studies and the model must be considered. Firstly, a large number 
of participants had to be excluded from the eye tracking study due to technical problems, so 
the  remaining  13  versus  13  groups  are  relatively  small.  Larger  sample  sizes  would  be 
advantageous  in  order  to  detect  small  effects,  and  also  to  examine  underlying  factor 
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structures.  
As  the  studies  looked only at  non-clinical  populations,  it  would  also  be  beneficial  to 
investigate whether the same levels of self disorder symptoms and pattern of eye movement 
performance  holds  in  other  schizophrenia  spectrum  conditions,  such  as  schizotypal 
personality  disorder  or  schizoid  personality  disorder.  Examining  these  populations  may 
elucidate whether these symptoms are found in all schizophrenia spectrum disorders, which 
would indicate a shared underlying deficit.
The  proposed  model  could  be  tested  empirically  in  a  number  of  ways,  such  as 
investigating  attributions  of  causation  among  schizophrenia  spectrum  patients.  There  is 
evidence that such patients have unusual perceptions of causation (Jolley et al., 1999), which 
may be influencing their judgements of agency. The hypothesis would be that schizophrenia 
patients make judgements of causality based more on information in the external world than 
on beliefs about the intentions of agents.
Future  studies  could  use  other  empirical  measures  of  agency  to  correlate  with  self 
disorders in clinical and non-clinical populations. The unusual performance in self recognition 
paradigms, false feedback tasks and intentional binding paradigms which has been observed 
in schizophrenia patients may also be found in non-clinical populations who are high in self 
disorder  symptoms.  The benefit  of  this  approach is  that  it  allows for  the investigation of 
relations  between  specific  symptoms  of  schizophrenia  and  certain  cognitive  deficits.  As 
schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disorder, two patients with the same diagnosis may show 
entirely different symptoms, and it is thus hard to make general claims about the disorder. By 
focusing specifically on self disorder symptoms, the relation between this specific deficit and 
other cognitive anomalies can be investigated.
4.4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis first considered the inconsistencies between theoretical models 
and empirical evidence regarding the experience of agency in schizophrenia. It presented a 
new method of reliably measuring self disorders in non-clinical populations, demonstrating 
that  it  is  a  useful  tool  for  the  investigation  of  specific  symptoms  in  the  schizophrenia 
spectrum.  For  the  first  time,  a  link  was  made  between  self  disorder  symptoms  and 
performance on eye movement tasks, which was made possible by the novel adaptation of 
phenomenological concepts into behavioural paradigms.
These  findings  concord  with  theoretical  conceptions  of  schizophrenia  and  have  been 
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incorporated into a  model  combing the neurocognitively-based comparator  model  and the 
phenomenologically-based ipseity-hyperreflexivity model. The connection of disorders of self 
and  disorders  of  agency  is  a  step  towards  a  more  complete  understanding  of  cognitive 
dysfunctions in the schizophrenia spectrum. It is also a demonstration of the possibility of 
integrating insights and models from different fields in order to understand complex clinical 
phenomena, and of the advantages of an interdisciplinary approach.
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Abstract:
The field of agency research has produced a wide variety of experimental paradigms and 
interesting  results,  especially  regarding  the  experiences  of  agency  in  patients  with 
schizophrenia.  However,  there has  yet  to  emerge a  clear  consensus  regarding the relation 
between theoretical constructions of agency and the various results produced by experimental 
observation. This paper will attempt to redress this  by describing the various experimental 
paradigms in use within the field, and considering the conceptual aspect of agency which each 
measures. 
A  new  theoretical  conception  of  agency  is  presented  which  explains  the  apparently 
contradictory  findings  that  people  with  schizophrenia  show  both  enhanced  and  reduced 
agency. The model presented is formulated as a weighting of prior mental states (efference 
copies) and retrospective sensory feedback, based on the reliability of those inputs. When 
predictions are inaccurate, people with schizophrenia rely more heavily on post-hoc sensory 
feedback  to  determine  judgments  of  agency.  Hence  the  different  experimental  findings: 
paradigms  which  ask  participants  to  makes  judgments  of  agency  may  find  both  under-
estimations and over-estimations dependent upon the sensory feedback which is available to 
the participants.
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1. Introduction
Agency, the experience of control we have over our movements and actions, is a topic of 
interest for psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers. Helmholtz (1866) first raised the 
question: when we see motion, how do we know that it is our eyes moving across the world, 
and  not  the  world  moving  in  front  of  our  eyes?  How  do  we  distinguish  self-produced 
movements from movements of the outside world? We have a feeling of control over our 
movements, which seems natural and invisible to us in everyday life. However, certain mental 
disorders,  notably schizophrenia,  show symptoms which have  been described in  terms of 
disorders of agency, suggesting that a disruption in this experience of control may lead to 
various cognitive and social problems (Kircher & Leube, 2003). 
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It is also of interest to examine the experience of agency in healthy subjects, to see in what 
situations and to  what degree people consider themselves to  be the agent of actions.  The 
neural basis of agency has been investigated extensively in recent years, but as yet there is no 
consensus regarding which brain structures or networks are responsible for the  experience of 
being  an  agent  (see  Sperduti,  2011  for  a  review).  This  paper  will  focus  on  behavioural 
measures of agency, and the results reported will be behavioural. These paradigms may be 
utilised in a neuroimaging context, but a review of neural findings is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
1.1. A note on definitions
The  term "agency"  can  be  used  to  denote  experiences  ranging  from control  over  motor 
movements (e.g. moving a finger) to making decisions which affect the outcome of one's life 
(e.g. deciding to become a scientist). Different fields use the term in vastly different ways,  
which has lead to some confusion when attempting to broach interdisciplinary work on the 
topic. This paper will focus on what could be termed “low-level” agency, referring to simple 
voluntary motor actions. An assumption, not considered here but open to future investigation, 
is that these low-level experiences of agency build together over time to create an experience 
of higher-level agency such as making plans for the future.
1.2. Sense of Ownership / Sense of Agency
One  important  distinction  to  be  made  is  between  the  sense  of  agency and  the  sense  of 
ownership.  Sense  of  ownership  refers  to  a  feeling  that  one's  body (and,  debatably,  one's 
thoughts too) belong to you; that you are the owner of them. We can experience ownership 
without agency, for example in a reflex action – when we touch a hot stove and our hand jerks 
away, we did not consciously choose to make that movement, yet it still feels as if our hand is 
the thing which is moving. Breakdowns in the sense of ownership can be found in some 
pathologies, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia or alien/anarchic hand syndrome. Gallagher 
(2000) describes the difference as such: the sense of agency is the sense that I am causing or 
generating a movement, while the sense of ownership is the sense that I am the one who is 
undergoing the experience. This paper will focus primarily on the aspect of sense of agency.
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1.3. Feeling of agency / Judgment of agency
A further important distinction within the concept of sense of agency is between feeling of 
agency and judgment of agency. The feeling of agency  refers to a pre-reflective feeling of 
acting,  while judgment of agency refers to deciding that an action was yours after the fact 
(see Gallagher,  2000). The sense of agency is reliant upon both agentive experiences (i.e. 
experiences of feeling of agency), and also the mechanisms responsible for action production 
(i.e.  comparator  systems;  see  section  2.1.2).  An  important  difference  between  these  two 
concepts is that the feeling of agency involves generating an action through the creation of an 
efference copy which is private to the subject. A judgment of agency, however, is based on 
comparing the intentional goal (that is, some kind of theory of mind) to the current state of the 
environment (which is not private, and may be shared with other observers) (Daprati et al.,  
1997). 
1.4 The debate over mental causation
The debate within philosophy over mental causation focuses on how it is possible for a mental 
state (such as intention or desire) to cause a physical effect (such as a bodily movement). 
Given that mental states are not physical, how is it possible that they have physical effects? It 
feels to me as if my desire caused my behaviour - that is, I have the experience of conscious 
will causing action - but in fact it is difficult to explain how this could be the case given our 
current knowledge of mind and brain. This has lead some thinkers to reject the concept of 
mental states as causal and describe the experience of conscious will as an illusion (Wegner, 
2004). 
The relation to sense of agency is this: under a causal account, to experience one's movements 
as voluntary actions is to experience them as being caused by one's mental states (Bayne, 
2008). This highlights the importance of mental states to accounts of sense of agency and the 
relevance of empirical findings to the philosophical debate.
2. Disturbances of agency in mental disorders
Although sense of agency is so fundamental to our experience that it is hard to imagine life 
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without it, disturbance or disruption of the sense of agency can be observed in some mental 
disorders.  In  motor  disorders  such  as  Parkinson's  disease,  patients  cannot  control  the 
movement of parts of their bodies (Morris, 2002). In obsessive-compulsive disorder, patients' 
flow  of  consciousness  may  be  disrupted  by  obtrusive  or  reoccurring  thoughts,  such  a 
reoccurring thought that "I could be responsible for a car crash" (Salkovskis, 1995). However, 
it is debatable the degree to which any person, whether healthy or disordered, has control or 
agency over their thinking (Campbell, 2002). 
2.1. Specific example: agency in schizophrenia
Of particular interest to this review is patients with schizophrenia, as they experience a range 
of symptoms related to disturbed agency (Gallagher, 2007) and report a profound change in 
their  phenomenological  experience  of  action  (Sass  and  Parnas,  2007).  Some  patients 
experience delusions of control, where they believe that another person or entity is controlling 
their  bodies.  Others  report  a  loss  of inherent  “mineness” of their  actions  (Sass  & Parnas 
2003). 
2.1.2. The Comparator Model and its predictions
The  most  popular  theoretical  model  of  schizophrenia,  the  comparator  model,  posits  a 
mechanism through which the sense of agency may be reduced or impaired in schizophrenia 
(Blakemore et al., 1998, Blakemore et al., 2000). It states that before an action is made, the 
motor system generates a prediction of the likely sensory consequences of that action, also 
known as efference copy. Once the action has been made, the efference copy is compared to 
the actual sensory feedback, and if they match then the subject feels themselves to be the 
agent of the action. In schizophrenia, the efference copy is supposed to be inaccurate, leading 
to sensory mismatch, and therefore to a loss of the feeling of agency (Blakemore, Wolpert and 
Frith, 2002). Symptoms such as delusions of control may occur as the actual sensory input 
does not match the prediction,  so one's thoughts and actions may appear to be externally 
generated. There is a correlation between the severity of delusions of control and less precise 
predictions of sensory consequences of action (Synofziket al., 2010). These patients are more 
reliant upon external and post-hoc cues when assigning agency to themselves or others (Frith, 
2012).
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This model predicts that in an experimental setting, people with schizophrenia would typically 
show a lessened sense of agency and this has been found using some paradigms (see Frith, 
2012).  In  other  paradigms,  however,  people  with  schizophrenia  show  an  enhanced  or 
increased  sense  of  agency  (e.g.  Franck  et.  al,  2001;  Voss,  2010).  To  understand  these 
apparently contradictory experimental findings, the concept of agency must be more carefully 
defined, and the paradigms must be considered in terms of the aspect of agency which they 
measure (see Synofzik et al., 2008). 
2.1.3. The Free Energy Principle and hierarchical processing models
The concept of predictions as inherently important to cognitive processing is reiterated in 
Friston's (2010) free energy account. This approach states that the mind/brain is optimised so 
as to process large amounts of information in an efficient manner by making predictions about 
the  likely  consequences  of  the  actions  of  oneself  or  others.  Attention  and  resources  are 
dedicated only to those things which are incongruous with predictions. On a neural level, this 
efficiency is implemented by predictive coding mechanisms (Firston & Kiebel, 2009). This 
predictive coding is  effected  in  both directions  by top-down probabilistic  models   -  so a 
person's  knowledge and experience of the world is  used to  make predictions  about likely 
outcomes. When something unexpected happens, it is attended to because of its incongruity. 
Clark (2012) applies this model to perception, cognition and action, and argues that these 
three  concepts  are  inherently intertwined without  clear  boundaries  between them.  This  is 
important for understanding the nature of the experience of action: that the feeling of agency 
may not be dissociable from the perceptual and cognitive processes which support it.
This  account  can  also be  applied  to  schizophrenia,  particularly in  examining the  sensory 
effects  of  self-produced  actions.  Brown  et  al.  (2013),  for  example,  discuss  the  relation 
between the experience of agency and sensory attenuation. Sensory attenuation refers to the 
finding that the sensory consequences of self-produced actions are experienced as less intense 
than the sensory consequence of other-produced actions.  When a person makes an action 
which produces a sound, for example, they experience that sound as being less loud than if it 
were produced by another person (Weiss, Herwig & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011). However, this 
sensory attenuation is known to be reduced in schizophrenia (Blakemore et al., 2000), and 
within  this  group,  poor  prediction  of  the  sensory  consequences  of  one's  own  actions  is 
correlated  with  the  strength  of  delusions  of  influence  (Lindner,  2005).  This  reduction  in 
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sensory attenuation can give rise to false or delusional beliefs about agency (Brown et al., 
2013), making it less clear whether an action was produced by oneself or another. This may 
relate  to  the  self-disorder  symptoms  of  schizophrenia,  as  the  distinction  between  self-
produced  and  other-produced  actions  is  essential  for  the  pre-reflexive  feeling  of  unified 
selfhood (Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013).
2.1.4. Apparently contradictory findings
The comparator  model  predicts  reduced sense of agency in schizophrenia,  however  some 
experiments have found that sense of agency is enhanced, such as the false feedback tasks of 
Franck et al. (2001). An image of a computer-generated hand is imposed over the subject's 
hand using mirrors, and movements are altered spatially or temporally and the subject must 
identify whether the movement seen is their own. Schizophrenic patients tend to identify these 
alien hands as belonging to them more than healthy controls. Here patients are claiming more 
agency than controls, showing an the distortions of agency in schizophrenia are not only in 
the direction of reduced or too little agency.
Further,  the comparator  model  may explain the feeling of agency,  but is  not  sufficient  to 
explain the judgment of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008). A problem with the model is regarding 
the  threshold  at  which  a  difference  between  predicted  and  actual  feedback  indicates  a 
mismatch - the threshold cannot be very low as subjects still identify movements as their own 
when manipulated spatially (Franck et al., 2001) and correctly identify their voices when the 
pitch is changed (Cahill, 1996). At what point  is the distinction between self-produced and 
other-produced  actions  drawn?  Suggestion  of  a  second,  higher-order  comparator  leads  to 
infinite regress. In order to determine what the effects of a movement are, the comparator 
system must already represent which movements are self-caused.
Although the comparator model is often invoked to explain first rank symptoms including 
delusions of control and auditory hallucinations, there remain several inconsistencies between 
the theory and empirical findings. One would expect that a failure in the forward model would 
cause major  deficits  in  motor  control,  but  this  is  not  generally impaired in schizophrenia 
(Frith, 2012). Another issue is that mere failure of prediction is not sufficient to explain how 
delusions are generated (Davies, 2001). Also, the model might explain why a patient believes 
that they are not in control of their actions, but it does not explain why they attribute agency 
to another  person (nor why they believe any particular specific  person to be responsible) 
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(Waters & Badcock, 2010).
As yet, there is no consensus regarding how agency can be measured empirically, and how 
these empirical findings can support or challenge the dominant theoretical model. In order to 
understand  the  source  of  these  contradictions,  we  will  now  examine  the  experimental 
paradigms currently used to measure agency, and consider what aspect of agency each of 
them engages with.
3. Experimental paradigms
A number of different paradigms to investigate agency are available in the literature, but no 
one is accepted as standard. For the sake of future research, it would be beneficial to assess 
these paradigms and discuss the aspects of agency which they measure. This may also help to 
explain  some  apparently  contradictory  findings  in  the  literature  -  for  example,  some 
paradigms  have  found enhanced  sense  of  agency in  schizophrenia  and  some have  found 
reduced sense of agency Five types of paradigm will be discussed below, and the aspects of 
agency that each measures will be considered. 
False feedback paradigms: 
One of the earliest experimental methods of measuring agency was the false feedback method 
developed by Nielsen (1963) used on healthy subjects. This paradigm involved the subject 
and the experimenter placing their hand into a box and the subject being asked to draw a 
straight line on a piece of paper. The box was designed such that the subject could see their 
hand, but a mirror placed inside could be used by the experimenter to make it appear as if the 
experimenter's hand had taken the place of the subject's. Thus the experimenter could allow 
the subject to see their own hand drawing a straight line on some trials, but make it appear as 
if the subject's hand was moving in another direction on other trials. After the experiment, 
subjects were asked for a phenomenological description of their experience, to see how they 
reacted  to  what  appeared to  be their  hand moving without  their  control.  The majority of 
participants (18 out of 20) continued to perceive the alien hand as belonging to them even 
when it moved differently from their hand's real movement. The authors also took note of 
aspects of the phenomenal experience including experiences of non-volition and perceptual 
abnormalities.
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The  findings  were  that  participants  would  automatically  compensate  for  the  (false) 
movements that they saw, even without being consciously aware that they were doing so – if, 
for example, their virtual hand appeared to be curving to the right, then their actual actual 
hand would make a movement which curved to the left. They also found that people tended to 
maintain that the hand was their own, even in the face of bizarre movements. They did not 
experience a  breakdown of  personal  identity.  When subjects  described a  conflict  between 
what  they felt  their  hand was doing and what  they saw their  hand doing,  they tended to 
prioritize the visual information. 
This method allows an experimenter to induce an experience where it seems to the subject 
that their hand is moving in a way they did not intend. Thus it is an experimentally-induced 
experience of disruption of agency. The study by Nielsen focused on the explanations that 
different groups of subjects would give for this apparent disruption of agentic experience. It is 
useful to investigate the strategies used in order to account for disruption of agency, but this 
study makes no claims regarding the causes of these disruptions. 
This methodology was used again by Sørensen (2005) to investigate body ownership among 
bulimic women. Participants were exposed to the alien hand and the descriptions they gave of 
their experience were analyzed for content and classified into internal or external attribution 
of causation. He found that bulimic women compared to both men and non-bulimic women 
experienced a significantly lesser degree of sense of agency and were more likely to identify 
external forces as causing their movements. 
A different form of "false feedback" was used in the paradigm of Fourneret and Jeannerod 
(1998), following the work of Malenka et al. (1982) which found that healthy people are able 
to recognize and correct errors in their movements without exteroceptive signals, but people 
with schizophrenia are less able to do so. Fourneret and Jeannerod asked participants to make 
movements with a stylus, drawing a straight line. The appearance of the line was modified 
(originally using mirrors, and in later versions with computer software), so that the line which 
appeared was spatially deviant. After each trial, participants were shown images a variety of 
lines at varying spatial deviations and asked which line corresponded to their movements. 
They found that  most  subjects  (9 out  of  N=13)  misperceived the  direction  of  their  hand 
movement (thinking that they had moved their hand in the direction of the spatial deviation). 
The authors concluded that normal subjects had poor conscious monitoring of their motor 
actions and are not necessarily aware of the signals generated by their own movements.
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Computerised false feedback paradigms:
Variations on the false feedback method have developed as technological progression has 
made such false feedback easier to give. Franck et al. (2001) used a methodology in which 
subjects were invited  to hold a joystick and instructed to make various movements with it. A 
computer-generated virtual hand was imposed on top of their own hand through the use of 
mirrors. The visual feedback of the virtual hand at first matched the subject's own hand, but in 
later trials spatial and temporal discrepancies were introduced. Subjects were asked after each 
trial whether the movement they had seen the virtual hand perform was their own or not. The 
authors compared healthy controls (N=29) to people with schizophrenia both with delusions 
of  control  (N=6)  and  without  (N=18).  They  found  that  both  healthy  and  schizophrenic 
subjects would accept a movement as their own if it was less than 150ms temporally distorted 
or  15°  spatially  distorted,  suggesting  a  limit  to  the  accuracy of  perception  of  one's  own 
movements. Patients with and without delusions of control were less accurate than control 
when temporal distortion was at 300 ms or more, in that they continued to claim ownership 
over the movement even when it was delayed. 
Surprisingly, patients without delusions of control did not generally differ from the control 
group in their responses when movements were distorted spatially. Patients with delusions of 
control gave more positive responses regarding ownership than the other schizophrenic group 
or the control group, in both spatial and temporal conditions. This method is effective for 
measuring the degree of spatial or temporal change in feedback under which a subject still 
recognizes a movement as their own. Overall, the study found a high willingness of subjects  
to accept movements as their own, even when they were spatially or temporally distorted, 
particularly in the group of schizophrenics with delusions of control.
One issue is that this methodology asks subjects to make a post-hoc judgment about their 
ownership over the movement they have seen. Subjects were asked whether the movement 
"exactly correspond[ed]" with the movements they had made. It could be that results were 
confounded by individual differences in attention, eye sight, or in interpretations of how close 
correspondence must be to be considered exact. Also, the question "Did the movement you 
saw on the screen exactly correspond to that you have made with your hand?" may be unclear 
to participants, as it could be asking for either a self-versus-other judgment or an assessment 
of the feeling of agency. Further, the group of patients with delusions of control was small 
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(N=6) so findings may not be generalisable.
A similar paradigm was used by Nahab et al (2011) in an experiment which included an MRI 
component, though here we will focus on the behavioural task. Healthy subjects were asked to 
perform sequential  hand movements  which  were  recorded with  a  special  glove,  and they 
received  real-time  visual  feedback  from  a  virtual  simulated  hand.  The  simulated  hand's 
movements  were  varied  by the  computer  so that  the  subject  had  between 100% and 0% 
control  over the movements of  the simulation.   After  each block,  subjects  were asked to 
indicate the level of control they felt over the movements on a scale of 0 – 100. They found 
that subjects were fairly accurate in their estimates of the degree to which they had control, 
finding  the  estimates  to  be  within  15%  of  the  actual  control  level  for  each  condition. 
Interestingly, when the subject's level of control was over 50%, they tended to overestimate 
this, while when the actual level of control was below 50%, they tended to underestimate. The 
authors thus argue that the sense of agency is not experienced as a binary perception (i.e.  
either present or absent), but rather that intermediate levels of agency may be experienced. 
Another  variation on the “false feedback” paradigm was created by Asai and Tanno (2007), 
whereby control and schizotypical subjects controlled a cursor on a computer screen using a 
mouse. The movements on screen were adjusted either spatially or temporally, and subjects 
were asked whether the movement they saw on screen was caused by themselves or by the 
experimenter. Interestingly, in this paradigm both perception of bias and sense of self-agency 
were addressed through separate verbal responses. In separate blocks, participants were asked 
whether they thought that a spatial or temporal delay had occurred (to assess perception of 
bias) or whether they thought that they had moved the cursor on their own (to assess sense of 
self-agency). 
The differentiation of the two tasks is important as a way to dissociative perception of an 
action from sense of agency over that action. This is particularly relevant when working with 
schizotypical people, as schizotypy has been linked to unusual judgments of causation (Jolley 
et  al.,  1999).  The  authors  found  that  the  high-schizotypical  people  showed  the  same 
judgments of bias as the low-schizotypical group, but they experienced a weaker sense of self-
agency on spatially-distorted trials. The authors acknowledge the small number of participants 
(N=20) means that the results should be considered preliminary. 
A further variation was created by Hauser et al. (2011), in which subjects heard a computer-
generated series of drum sounds and had to reproduce those sounds on a drum pad. Whilst 
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they were drumming, the sounds that subjects heard were either faithful replications of their 
input,  or  they  were  reproductions  of  the  computer-generated  sounds  (which  were  either 
identical to the original series, or sped up or slowed down).  They were then asked “who 
controlled the series of sounds?”and could respond with either “I did” or “the computer did”. 
They tested both schizophrenic and prodromal patients on this task as well as healthy controls. 
They found that both groups of patients showed an exaggerated self-attribution bias, that is, 
that  they  were  more  likely  to  claim agency  over  the  sounds  even  if  they  were  actually 
computer-generated.   There  was  no  significant  difference  between  schizophrenic  and 
prodromal patients in this bias, but it was correlated with the level of patients' ego-pathology. 
The  authors  also  found  that  patients'  performance  on  the  task  was  improved  when  the 
discrepancies between actual movement and received feedback were larger, unlike healthy 
controls whose performance did not benefit from these additional cues. They suggest that 
patients weight these external cues more heavily than their internal sensorimotor signals, and, 
in  cases  of  ambiguity  regarding  the  accuracy  of  internal  predictions,  rely  more  upon 
additional perceptual cues for agency judgments.
Agency judgment with priming paradigm:
Aarts et al. (2005) discuss the importance of time perception in agency: that is, how we often 
make a judgment of agency based on the temporal propinquity  of two events. They relate this 
to priming, in that a person's prior expectations about their intended action will influence the 
likelihood of them claiming authorship of an action. They investigated whether priming the 
effects of an action enhances the feeling of agency (and/or authorship) over that action. This is 
particularly  relevant  to  the  philosophical  discussion  of  the  role  of  intentions  in  apparent 
mental causation (see section 1.4).
The experimental paradigm involved a wheel of fortune games, in which participants had to 
move a grey square around a grid of white squares using a keyboard (Aarts et al., 2005). At 
the same time, another grey square was moved in the opposite direction by the computer. 
Participants had to stop the movement by pressing a different key, at which point a black 
square would appear. They had to judge whether the location of the black square was based on 
the current position of their grey square, or of the computer's grey square. This task allows 
some ambiguity about who was the cause of the final result, the participant or the computer,  
although the participant remains the generator of their actions.
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On some trials, the location of the black square was primed subliminally before the participant 
pressed  the  button.  The  finding  was  that  in  trials  which  had  been  primed  in  this  way, 
participants  were more  likely to  attribute  causation to  themselves.  This  demonstrates  that 
priming of effect information can influence the agency judgments of participants. 
Another measure of agency which included priming was performed by Gentsch et al., 2012. 
This involved presenting participants with two buttons: a left and a right key, each of which 
triggered  a  visual  effect  of  a  blue  or  a  red  square.  Blocks  were  either  high-  or  low- 
contingency,  such that  in  high-contingency conditions  each button  was  associated  with  a 
particular colour which appeared in 75% of trials (e.g. if the right key was associated with the 
blue square, then pressing the right key would result in a blue square on 75% of trials). In the 
other 25% of trials the other colour appeared. In low-contingency conditions, both keys were 
equally likely to produce either colour (i.e. either button produced each colour on 50% of 
trials). This task meant that factors such as shape, timing and location were kept constant 
between conditions. Priming took place before the button press, where a prime word was 
presented which was either the same or a different colour from the effect. Participants were 
asked to judge on a scale of 1 to 100 how strong they felt the causal relation between action 
and effect to be for each block. 
In  addition,  two control  tasks  were included:  an effect-only task in  which the participant 
observed  the  button  selection  and  outcome  without  pressing  anything  themselves,  and  a 
motor-only task in which participants pressed a button but no effect followed.
This paradigm was used to gather data in both healthy subjects and OCD patients. Healthy 
subjects gave higher agency ratings in congruously-primed conditions than incongruously-
primed  conditions  in  the  high-contingency  conditions  (but  not  the  low-contingency 
conditions).  OCD patients,  however,  gave  agency ratings  which were not  affected  by the 
congruency of the prime in both high- and low- contingency conditions. This demonstrated 
the differing weighting of components of agency between healthy and disordered individuals, 
as well  as the relevance of prior information about causation (in the form of priming) on 
judgments of agency. 
A further  experiment was performed by Damen, Baaren and Dijksterhuis (2014), who tested 
healthy  subjects  on  a  judgment  of  agency  task  which  included  priming.  Subjects  were 
presented with left and right buttons which generated tones, and asked to press a button of 
their  choice.  They  were  told  that  the  tones  may  be  produced  by  themselves  or  by  the 
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computer, but in fact the subjects always produced the tones themselves. They were asked at 
the end of each trial to indicate on a 1-100 scale the degree to which they felt they had caused 
the tone to occur. In some trials, before pressing a button, they were primed with a subliminal  
or supraliminal presentation of the word "left" or "right" - and this instruction could be either 
compatible with their button press or incompatible. The authors found that subliminal (i.e. 
non-conscious) incompatible primes lower agency ratings, but supraliminal (i.e. conscious) 
compatible  primes  also  lowered  agency ratings.  This  suggests  that  compatible  subliminal 
action primes may be used in action selection, leading to a strong sense of agency. However, 
the  conscious  awareness  that  one  is  following  an  instruction  would  reduce  the  sense  of 
agency. 
One issue with this study, however, is that the tones were always produced by the participants, 
never  another  person or  the computer.  It  is  unclear  how this  may have effected subjects'  
judgments of agency, as subjects may have found it implausible that the computer could be 
producing the tones. 
Intentional Binding paradigms:
Another approach to measuring agency is through asking subjects to report on the perceived 
timing of their own actions. Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras (2002) investigated the perceived 
time that elapsed between a voluntary action and its effects. Subjects watched a clock and 
judged the onset time of an event. There were four conditions, with a different event in each 
one - a voluntary key press, a TMS-induced pulse which caused their finger to twitch, a sham 
TMS condition, and an auditory tone. A tone was sounded 250ms after the event, and subjects 
estimated the time at which the event occurred. The finding was that, in the voluntary key 
press  condition,  the  awareness  of  the  action  was  shifted  later,  towards  the  tone,  while 
awareness of the tone was shifted earlier, towards the key press. Involuntary, TMS-produced 
actions showed the opposite effect, where the action was perceived as taking place earlier in 
time, and the effect later. 
The authors explain these effects as a binding; whereby awareness of voluntary action and 
perception of the action's sensory consequences are linked. The temporal interval between the 
two is underestimated, so it seems that they occurred closer together than they actually did. 
However, this binding effect is not found in actions which were not voluntary, such as a TMS-
induced movement. 
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A variation of the intentional binding paradigm which investigated the role of prior and post-
hoc information on feeling of agency was described by Voss et al (2010). The experiment was 
conducted as  described above,  but  with  a  variation in  the probability that  the  participant 
would hear the tone which comes after the button press. So on some trials the tone sounded 
50% of the time, and on others 75% of the time. This allowed the authors to investigate the 
role of intentions which were prior to the action (i.e. the intention to press the button) and of 
sensory information which comes after the action (i.e.  hearing the tone) in  the feeling of 
agency. The key condition investigated whether binding would still happen when the tone was 
expected but not heard (i.e. the trials in the 75% probability block which did not include the 
tone). 
The Voss et al. study confirmed findings that subjects with schizophrenia were more likely 
than controls to show binding based on incorrect feedback – that is, people with schizophrenia 
showed an excessive sense of agency based on post-hoc sensory information.
One issue with the Intentional Binding paradigm is that, being an implicit measure, it is not 
known for sure what aspect of agency it measures. Some have argued that the paradigm is 
better understood as a measure of causation than of feeling of agency (Buehner, 2012) – that 
is, that the change in temporal estimation seen is induced by the causal link between action 
and consequence, rather than agentic experience. Empirical investigation found the binding 
effect even in cases where the relevant action was performed by a machine, rather than the 
subject  themselves.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  demonstration  of  intentional  binding-type 
effects even in case where no intention was present. The author suggests that the effect would 
be better referred to as a specific type of causal binding, as intention may not be the driving 
force of the change in temporal estimations.
This would mean that intentional binding should not be considered a true measure of feeling 
of agency, but rather a property of the observation of causation generally. However, a recent 
study by Moore et al.  (2013) has found somewhat contradictory results. Subjects watched 
videos of a confederate pushing a button and were then asked to estimate the time which 
elapsed between button press and tone. The four conditions were: two causal conditions in 
which the tone was heard, one of which they were told was the confederate pushing the button 
when  they  chose,  and  the  other  of  which  was  the  same  video  but  described  as  the 
confederate's finger being moved by a motor; and two non-causal conditions, in which they 
saw the videos but heard no tones.
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This study found that the estimates of time elapsed were significantly different between the 
intentional and unintentional conditions, even though the videos that the subjects saw were 
the same. This suggests that the subjects' understanding of the prior intentions and/or mental 
states of the person shown in the video was relevant to the degree of temporal distortion 
which they displayed; and thus that the intentional binding effect may after all be based on 
intentional states. They considered the possibility that these data were affected by reaction 
times, but when assessed statistically,  the relationship between RT and mean interval time 
estimates was found to not be significant.
Although  this  study  supports  the  concept  of  intentional  binding  as  a  measure  of  agent 
causation, it does demonstrate that the IB effect is found when the participant observes others' 
actions as well as their own. That is to say, the IB effect is not exclusive to self-generated 
actions, but is found in other-generated actions too. Thus is it best understood as an implicit 
measure of agent causation.
Self-recognition paradigms:
An investigation of self-recognition was performed by van den Bos and Jeannerod (2002), 
examining the roles of both sense of body ownership and sense of actions. Subjects were 
invited  to  site  at  a  table  opposite  an  experimenter  and  lay  their  hand  on  the  table.  The 
experimenters  did  the  same,  and  each  hand  was  covered  by  a  glove  to  minimize 
morphological differences. Subjects were presented with an image of their own hand and also 
the experimenter's hand, and then hands performed the same movement, a different movement 
or no movement at all. Images were presented at various rotations also, so that the hands may 
be switched by 180° (swapped position with the experimenter)  or other degrees. Subjects 
were then asked to identify which of the hands seen on screen was their own.
Mistaken attribution (believing a hand to be yours when in fact it is not) was more common in 
the  180°  rotation  condition,  where  the  experimenter's  hand  appeared  where  the  subject 
expected their own hand to be, relative to their body. An anatomically plausible position of the 
hand seems to be an  important  cue  for  determining ownership.  However,  this  effect  was 
nullified when the experimenter's hand performed a different movement from the subject's 
hand. The findings were that subjects had difficulty in differentiating the experimenter's hand 
from  their  own  when  there  was  no  movement.  When  both  hands  executed  the  same 
movement,  subjects  could  identify their  hand somewhat  better.  When the  hands executed 
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different movements subjects could easily tell them apart. This suggests that the presence of 
movements was also a cue for determining ownership, even more importantly than the visual 
position of the hand.
A pilot study was conducted using this paradigm with schizophrenic patients, and found that 
patients  with hallucinations and those with delusions of control  showed more recognition 
errors than patients without hallucinations or healthy controls (Jeannerod et al., 2003). The 
patients made a notably high number of mistakes on trials in which both the experimenter's 
hand and the subject's hand made the same movement.  Important here is  the variation in 
performance within the schizophrenic group; the presence of hallucinations or delusions of 
control  made  a  significant  difference  to  the  subjects'  ability  to  distinguish  their  own 
movements from the movements of others.
Blakemore,  Frith  &  Wolpert  (1999)  came  up  with  a  different  and  inventive  method  of 
investigating self-produced actions. A long-standing finding regarding motor awareness is that 
when a subject produces a tickling motion on themselves, they report it as less tickly than the 
same motion performed by another person. (Weiskrantz, Elliott & Darlington,  1971). The 
assumption is that self-produced action generates an efference copy, and therefore the sensory 
consequences (of tactile stimulation on the skin) is less surprising and less tickly. 
In their experiment, subjects experienced a tactile stimulation on the palm of their hand which 
was either self-produced or externally produced by a robot. They also introduced a temporal 
delay or trajectory perturbation to the action after it was performed on some trials. Subjects 
rated self-produced stimulation as significantly less tickly, less intense and less pleasant than 
externally-produced stimulation. They also found that ratings of ticklishness increased with 
the delay between movement and stimulation and the degree of perturbation. 
In patients with schizophrenia, however, they found that these people did not differ in their 
ratings of ticklishness between movements produced by themselves and by others (Blakemore 
et al., 2000). This means that the patients were able to tickle themselves, which demonstrates 
their predictions of the sensory consequences of their actions was somehow impaired.
An extension of this paradigm was performed by Van Doorn, Hohwy & Symmons (2014), 
who investigated the effects of the body transfer illusion on the ability to tickle oneself. The 
body transfer illusion is a manipulation of body image, in which the experimenter, wearing a 
camera on their head, sits opposite the participant, who wears goggles which relay real-time 
visual information from the camera. The participant thus experiences actions from the visual 
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first-person perspective of the experimenter.  Whilst  in this  setup,  participants felt  tickling 
sensations on their hand which were generated either by themselves or by the experimenter, 
and were asked to rate how ticklish each sensation was. Surprisingly,  they found that the 
inability to tickle oneself remained even when the body transfer illusion was in effect. Even 
when they are receiving visual information from the perspective of another person, subjects 
still  rated  self-produced  movements  as  less  ticklish  than  other-produced movements.  The 
authors argue that this supports the account of action as involving suspension of attention to 
visual  feedback so that  proprioceptive signals  may be prioritised.  That  is,  when a person 
makes a voluntary action, the interoceptive signals regarding the effects of that action are 
attenuated, even when contextual cues such as those involved in body image, are manipulated.
Action ownership paradigms:
An experimental paradigm involving agency, priming and motor intention was performed by 
Wegner  and  Wheatley  (1999).  They paired  subjects  with  a  confederate  and  seated  them 
together in front of a screen and a trackball. Various objects were shown on the screen, and 
the trackball,  controlled by both subject and confederate simultaneously,  could be used to 
select an object. Subjects and confederate used the trackball to move a cursor on screen, and 
they had to stop the cursor on an object of their choice at an indicated time. The subject wore 
headphones  which  played  music  to  indicate  when  they  must  stop  on  an  object,  but  the 
headphones also played a voice speaking the name of various objects. After hearing the name 
of an object (either 30 seconds, 5 seconds or 1 second before the stop or 1 second after the 
stop), the confederate would stop the cursor on the image of that object. Participants then 
rated on a 1 to 100 scale whether they allowed the stop to happen or intended to make the 
stop. This experiment tested the effect of priming an object, to see if it would make subjects 
believe that the intention to stop on said object was theirs, even when the action was actually 
performed by the confederate.
Subjects generally perceived the forced stops as intentional, even when they were not caused 
by themselves. However, the degree to which they believed this depending upon the other 
conditions - it was lower when the prime was given 30 seconds before the stop, higher at 5 
seconds or 1 second before and lower again at 1 second after. This suggests that there is a 
particular time period during which intentions are formed, and that introducing priming cues 
at this time will make the subject more likely to claim agency over an action.
Page 63
A similar  paradigm was  used  with  healthy and  schizophrenic  patients  by Metcalfe  et  al. 
(2012)  in which subjects had to complete a movement task on a computer in which their  
inputs were sometimes distorted by random noise. They were asked to judge their degree of 
agency over the controls as well as the accuracy of their performance. They found that, on 
trials where inputs were distorted, healthy controls rated judgments of both performance and 
agency as lower than on non-distorted trials. Patients, however, showed lower judgments of 
performance on distorted trials but  not lower judgments of agency - that is, they knew that 
they had done the task less well but they still felt the same degree of agency of the movements 
even though they were distorted. The authors conclude that patients use publicly available 
external  cues  when making judgments  of  agency,  and not  internal  self-relevant  cues.   In 
contrast to the Wegner and Wheatley experiment, however, there was no other person present 
to whom agency could be attributed - rather, the subjects had to decide whether it was them or 
the computer who had agency. This is relevant as it is possible that assessments of self-vs-
other agency could be different when the other in question is a person rather than a computer.
4.1. A proposed solution
Discrepancies between theoretical and empirical models of agency in schizophrenia may be 
explained by different weighting of information. Agency may arise from the integration of 
both  predictions  and  sensory  experiences.  Thus  if  internal  predictions  about  visual 
consequences  of  actions  are  inaccurate  (Synofzik  et  al.,  2010),  then  visual  (or  other 
perceptual)  information  may  be  weighted  more  strongly  in  attribution  of  agency.  So 
schizophrenic  patients  rely  more  on  visual  information  than  on  prior  mental  states  or 
intentions to determine agency. Thus experiments would fine both over- and under-attribution 
of agency in schizophrenia, depending on the particular task (Voss, 2010 ; Synofzik, 2010). 
On  tasks  which  provide  sensory  feedback,  people  with  schizophrenia  would  put  more 
emphasis on the feedback than on their intentions when assessing their own agency.
This explanation for the discovery of both over- and under-attribution of agency is supported 
by the findings of Voss et al (2010). By utilising an intentional binding (IB) paradigm, they 
differentiated the predictive and retrospective components of sense of agency experimentally. 
IB experiments show that people under-estimate the temporal gap between two actions (e.g. 
pressing a button and hearing a tone) if they believe that their action has caused the effect. By 
varying the probability than the tone will be heard, the experimenters differentiated the degree 
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to  which  subjects  could  predict  the  tone.  Here  schizophrenic  subjects  showed very little 
evidence of predictive components in IB; their experience of agency was driven by sensory 
experience after the event - i.e. retrospectively.  In healthy controls, on the other hand, the 
probability of hearing a tone greatly affected the IB effects, suggesting that for these people 
their sense of agency rested mostly upon predictive mechanisms.
Proposed here is a more complex model of agency in schizophrenia: rather than being simply 
reduced  or  enhanced,  sense  of  agency relies  on  two  distinct  components:  predictive  and 
retrospective.  Schizophrenic  subjects  may  show  abnormal  weighting  between  these  two 
components, which can result in either over- or under-attribution of agency, dependent upon 
context. In relation to the comparator model, this view states that predictions and sensory data 
are  not  just  compared,  but added together  in some kind of  integration process.  Moore & 
Haggard (2008) suggest that this integration process may be Bayesian in nature, weighting 
prior information against retrospective information to minimize uncertainty. For instance, if a 
prior  is  weak and unreliable  (as  it  may be in  schizophrenia due to  the "faulty prediction 
mechanism" described in the feedforward model), then estimations would rely more heavily 
upon retrospective information.
The Bayesian network theory is supported by evidence from computational models (Hindriks 
et al., 2011), which distinguish assessments of causality (i.e. judgments of agency) from the 
feeling  of  doing (i.e.  feeling  of  agency).  Treur  (2011)  attempts  to  apply a  computational 
model to schizophrenia which differentiate between prior and retrospective ownership states. 
But this model found that a low predictive component would also lead to low retrospective 
component and therefore reduced sense of agency. However, this was only true for a low 
threshold of prediction components: i.e. that very poor prediction implies no self-ownership. 
A Bayesian approach to this prior/retrospective model may have different findings due to the 
weighting of different states.
Abnormal integration of predictive and retrospective components of agency would explain 
why schizophrenic subjects are able to make accurate corrections to false feedback without 
being aware that they are doing so, because the prediction is suppressing the retrospective 
sensory data. When the differences between movements and feedback are made sufficiently 
large  as  to  reach  conscious  awareness,  schizophrenic  subjects  are  slow  to  switch  to  a 
conscious strategy as they become heavily reliant upon the retrospective data. It may be that 
when differences between movements and feedback are small,  subjects are experiencing a 
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prediction-based sense of agency,  but  when the differences enter  consciousness  then they 
must switch to a retrospective-based judgment of agency. 
4.2 Putting this into practice: future experiments and topics of interest
This work reinforces the need for carefully planning of experiments regarding agency, and of 
the interpretation of these experiments. If subjects are asked to indicate the degree to which 
they felt control over an action, then it must be remembered that this is a judgment of agency,  
not a report of a first-personal feeling of agency. It is also important to consider the manner in 
which such a question is phrased: "did you make that happen or did the computer?" is quite a 
different question than "to what degree did you feel in control of that action?". 
Paradigms  which  are  capable  of  differentiating  judgments  of  agency from the  feeling  of 
agency are of particular value when dealing with patients. In healthy people under normal 
conditions, judgments and feelings of agency are likely to be congruous, and measuring one 
should  reliably correlate  with  the  other.  In  schizophrenia  particularly,  however,  the  exact 
nature  of  the  disruption  of  agency  is  unclear.   Identifying  the  underlying  factor  in  this 
disruption  will  require  carefully  calibrated  experiments  which  can  differentiate  between 
different aspects of agency.
Fruitful experiments could involve a combination of implicit measures, which tend to measure 
the feeling of agency, and explicit measures, which tend to measure judgments of agency. 
This also has the advantage of reducing experimenter effects, as it is not always clear to the 
participants what is expected of them. Other sensory modalities are of interest too: how are 
experiences  of  agency  affected  by  perception  of  touch,  as  opposed  to  sound  or  visual 
feedback? And further, what is the exact distinction between reflexive and volitional actions? 
Is the experience of agency over very fast actions binary (i.e. "I did that" or "I did not do 
that") or is it on a continuous scale? What about experiences of agency over different kinds of 
bodily movements - most experiments use motor movements of the hands, but do the same 
agentic experience apply to other motor conditions, such as eye movements? All of these 
avenues may provide insight into the nature of agency, both in healthy subjects and in patients 
with schizophrenia.
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5. Conclusion
The common paradigms used to examine agency in the neurocognitive literature have given 
some apparently contradictory results, especially in schizophrenia, due to a lack of conceptual 
clarity  over  exactly  what  aspect  of  agency is  being  measured.  Philosophical  concepts  of 
agency as a complex weighting of information from both prior mental states and post-hoc 
sensory information can help explain these apparent discrepancies. 
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Abstract:
Objective:  To explore whether anomalies of self-experience occur and can be 
assessed reliably in a non-clinical sample, and whether the prevalence of these 
anomalies depends upon the degree of psychometrically defined schizotypy. 
Method: Participants with either high (n=30) or low (n=20) schizotypy scores were 
interviewed using a modified version of the Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience (EASE). The degree to which interviewees experienced self disorder 
symptoms was rated by the interviewer and an independent rater. Inter-rater reliability 
was calculated for each item and the average reliability scores for domain scores and 
the total were calculated. 
Results: Most items (=66) showed substantial or perfect agreement (kappa > 0.61), 
with a few  (=6) showing moderate agreement (kappa > 0.41). The average inter-rater 
reliability score of all items indicated substantial agreement (mean kappa = 0.76).
Conclusion: The assessment showed good levels of reliability when measuring self 
disorder symptoms among non-clinical populations who were high or low in 
schizotypy.
Keywords: 
Schizophrenia, observer variation, psychometrics.
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1. Introduction
Self disorders (or Ich-Störungen) are symptoms related to a loss of unity of the self, and are 
considered paradigmatic of schizophrenia (Estroff, 1989; Sass and Parnas, 2003). Examples 
of  such  disorders  include  feeling  as  if  the  boundary  between  self  and  world  is  unclear, 
difficulty in distinguishing experience from a memory or a dream, or feeling as if the mind 
does not reside comfortably within the body (Cermolacce, Naudin, & Parnas, 2007). 
Although the relevance of self-disorders is well-established in phenomenological literature 
(e.g.  Parnas  & Handest,  2003;  Sass,  2000;  Sims  1991;  Moe & Docherty,  2014),  there  is 
relatively little knowledge of their biological and psychological underpinnings. This is partly 
due  to  the  idiosyncratic  nature  of  the  putative  phenomena,  which  makes  it  difficult  to 
operationalise the construct in a reliable and valid way. 
The Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) (Parnas et al., 2005) aims to assess 
self-disorder  experiences  through  a  clinical  interview  and  a  rating  on  a  descriptive-
psychopathological  checklist  of  57  items.  All  items  are  rated  on  a  4-point  Likert  scale 
(0=absent,  1=questionably  present,  2=present[mild],  4=present[moderate], 
5=present[severe]). 
The EASE and other approaches to assessing self disorders (e.g. parts of the Bonn Scale for 
the Assessment of Basic Symptoms, BSABS, Gross, 1989) have been developed for use in 
clinical  settings  with  patients  with  schizophrenia  or  other  severe  psychotic  disorders. 
Investigation of such patients may be limited by medication and the multitude of different 
functional  impairments  found  in  many  patients.  Hence,  research  in  anomalies  of  self-
experience may be complemented by the investigation of less severely impaired individuals. 
Self  disorder symptoms have been observed in people who are at  high risk for psychosis 
(Nelson,  Thompson  &  Yung,  2012),  and  experiences  traditionally  considered  markers  of 
schizophrenia  may be  found and the  non-clinical  population  too (Peters  & Garety,  1996; 
Verdoux & van Os, 2002). There is a growing consensus that psychotic symptoms exist on a 
continuum (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). 
The extent of psychotic-like symptoms in non-clinical subjects is probably influenced by their 
degree of sychizotypy – a personality trait characterised by unusual experiences, cognitive 
disorganisation,  introvertive anhedonia and impulsive non-conformity (Mason, Claridge & 
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Jackson, 1995).  Here we focus on schizotypy as a dimension of normal individual differences 
which correlates with the risk of developing schizophrenia (Cyhlarova & Claridge, 2005). A 
widely  used  measure  of  schizotypy  is  the  Schizotypal  Personality  Questionnaire  (SPQ) 
(Raine, 1991), which has good reliability and consistent underlying factors (Calkins, Curtis, 
Grove & Iacono, 2004).
The present study was designed to explore the possibility of assessing self-disorders in a non-
clinical sample,  especially in high-schizotypy individuals,  using the EASE.  However,  we 
expected the non-structured interview would not be adequate for use in a non-clinical setting, 
as  other  typical  sources  of  information  (e.g.  clinical   observation,  patient  charts)  are  not 
available.  Hence,  we  developed  a  semi-structured  interview  with  questions  designed  to 
provoke the subject to discuss the topics of interest. Participants of high- or low- schizotypy 
were interviewed, and their interviews rated by two people to determine inter-rater reliability 
of the assessment. 
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Overview
The study consisted of  (1)  an internet-based schizotypy screening using the SPQ (Raine, 
1991; German version by Klein, Andresen, & Jahn, 1997), and (2) a personal assessment of 
self-disorders in a sub-sample of participants high or low in schizotypy.
2.2. Participants
The  internet  screening  was  advertised  on  mailing  lists  for  students  at  the  Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin and the Freie Universität Berlin, in a local newspaper, and on a public 
classified advertisements board. Informed consent was given by all participants before the 
survey. After the screening, those who were willing  to attend a personal assessment were 
asked for contact information. A total of 1296 participants completed the screening, of which 
428 were discarded from further analysis due to having not completed all questions, and SPQ 
scores for the remaining participants were calculated. Of the remaining 868 participants, those 
who scored above the 90th percentile (SPQ score >=41, N=129) or below the 10th percentile 
(SPQ score <=7, N=145) were assigned to the high- and low- SPQ groups, respectively. The 
cutoff scores are similar to those in Raine (1991), who found a cutoff for SPQ scores at 41 for 
the 90th percentile and 12 for the 10th percentile. 
Participants with a history of head injury or neurological conditions, as assessed through self-
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report in the demographic information questionnaire (see "Other assessment instruments"), 
were  excluded  from  the  second  part  of  the  study.  From  the  remaining  participants,  we 
randomly selected members from the high-SPQ group and the low-SPQ. Sixty-three high-
SPQ participants were invited in total (of which 30 accepted), and 25 low-SPQ people (of 
which 20 accepted). The larger size of the high-schizotypy group is due to the desire to use 
this data for further analysis, and for future planned experiments using this group. 
The demographic data for the final groups were as follows: high-SPQ group: 23 female and 7 
male, mean age of 27.5 (SD=6.6) and mean 12.8 years in education (SD=1.7). The low-SPQ 
group:14 female, 6 male participants, mean age of 32.7 (SD=11.0) and mean 12.6 years in 
education (SD=0.92).    
Before  the  examination,  informed  consent  was  again  obtained  by all  participants  for  the 
second part of the study. Participants were reimbursed for their time at a rate of 10€ / hour. 
The  study was  approved  be  the  ethics  committee  of  the  Institute  for  Psychology of  the 
Humboldt-University. 
2.3. Development and execution of EASE interview
In formalising the EASE checklist into a semi-structured interview, each item was assigned a 
question.  These questions were open-ended and implied a broad definition of the phenomena 
to encourage participants to address the topic with their own words. Some items had follow-
up questions which for more specific information. The interviews were conducted in German. 
For  interview questions  translated  into  English,  see  appendix.  For  the  German  language 
version used in this study, please contact the corresponding author.
The  three  interviewers  were  advanced  Psychology students  with  clinical  experience.  One 
author was trained on the use of the EASE, and passed this training on to the interviewers 
(interviewers  trained  for  around  30  hours  total),  including  understanding  the  underlying 
phenomenological constructs of each item, building rapport with participants, and interpreting 
the descriptions of the participants. 
The rating took place after all interviews were completed. The interviewers viewed the full 
videotapes and rated each item for each participant. Independently, one other interviewer also 
rated each interview. The second rater did not have access to the participant or to the original 
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interviewer's notes. In Both the interviewer and the second rater were blind to the schizotypy 
score. 
2.4. Other assessment instruments
The  internet-based  screening  comprised  the  Schizotypal  Personality  Questionnaire  (SPQ) 
(Raine,  1991),  questions  on  basic  demographic  data  (age,  gender,  years  and  level  of 
education)  and a  26-item questionnaire  on conspiracy theories,  which  is  not  topic  of  the 
current  paper.  The SPQ is a  74-item questionnaire  to assess schizotypy,   which has high 
internal  reliability  (0.91),  test-retest  reliability  (0.82),  convergent  validity  (0.59  to  0.81), 
discriminant validity, and criterion validity (0.63, 0.68) (Raine, 1991). It is based on the DSM 
criteria for schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
but was also designed to measure schizotypal traits in non-clinical groups. 
In  the  second part  of  the  study we checked for  diagnoses  of  mental  disorders  using  the 
German version (Wittchen, Zaudig, & Fydrich, 1997) of the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV (SCID I) (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon & First, 1994). Three members of the low-SPQ 
group had a former depressive episode.  In the high-SPQ group, eleven members had a former 
single major depression episode. Three further high-group participants had a recurrent major 
depressive disorder currently in remission,  and two members had bipolar I  disorder (both 
currently in  a  depressive  episode)  and two further  members  had biploar  II  disorder  (one 
currently in a depressive episode and one currently in remission).  None of the participants 
were currently in treatment for these symptoms. Formerly, four of the high-group and two of 
the low-group had been in cognitive therapy treatments,  but none took medication.  There 
were no other axis I diagnoses in either group. To check whether participants fulfilled the 
criteria for SPD we applied the respective part of the SCID II interview (Spitzer, Williams, 
Gibbon & First, 1994; German version by Wittchen, Zaudig & Fydrich, 1997). No participant 
fulfilled all criteria for SPD.
A demographic data questionnaire of our own design was used to assess age, gender, first 
language,  educational  information,  current  employment,  a  history  of  neurological  and 
psychiatric treatment handedness and drug and alcohol use.
2.5. Procedures
Participants  were  invited  through  email  and  telephone  communication  to  an  assessment 
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session at the Institute for Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. After being informed 
about  the  aims  of  the  study,  participants  completed  the  self-report  questionnaires.  The 
participants were interviewed using the modified EASE interview, typically lasting 1.5 to 3 
hours.  Interviews  were  video  recorded  for  later  rating.  Next,  the  SCID  interview  was 
conducted and afterward the participants took part in an eye tracking experiment, which is not 
a subject of this paper. 
2.6. Data analysis
Data  was  analysed  using  SPSS  19  (IBM  Corp,  Armonk,  NY)  and  MedCalc  (MedCalc 
software, Ostend, Belgium). 
Inter-rater  reliability  was  calculated  using  a  quadratically  weighted  kappa  for  the  pair  of 
ratings for each individual item. Kappa is a commonly used method for assessing agreement 
between raters which corrects for chance agreement and takes frequency into account (Sim & 
Wright, 2005). As the rating scale is ordinal in nature, the weighted kappa statistic is most 
appropriate for measuring inter-rater reliability (Stemler, 2004, Fleiss & Cohen, 1973). We 
chose a quadratic weighting as this can be interpreted as an intraclass correlation coefficient 
(Schuster, 2004; Brenner & Kliebsch, 1996). Individual kappa scores were averaged across 
the total sample, to obtain a general estimation of reliability. 
Once item kappa scores  had been calculated,  the  subtypes  of  several  items  showed poor 
reliability and were collapsed into a single item. For example, item 1.4 - thought block - has 
several  subtypes  (blocking,  fading,  combination).  As  these  subtypes  were  not  reliable 
individually, the highest rating from each subtype for each participant was taken as a score for 
thought block as a single item. Other subtypes collapsed into one item were 1.6 (Ruminations-
obsessions), 1.14 (Disturbance of time experience), 2.4 (Diminished presence), 2.7 (I-split), 
3.2 (Mirror-related phenomena), and 3.8 (Motor disturbances). Items 2.9 (Identity confusion), 
2.10  (Sense  of  change in  relation  to  chronological  age),  2.11.1  (occasional  fear  of  being 
homosexual) and 2.11.2 (a feeling as if being of the opposite sex) were collapsed into one 
item, labeled item 2.x.
Another paper which assessed reliability of the EASE used dichotomous rating, with items 
coded  as  0  (absent  or  questionably  present)  or  1  (definitely  present,  all  severity  levels) 
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(Møller, Haug, Raballo, Parnas, & Melle, 2011). So we tested the reliability of our data when 
the ratings were recoded into this dichotomous schema. Each item was recoded as a 0 (for 
ratings 0 or 1) or as a 1 (for ratings 2, 4 and 5), and the inter-rater reliability calculated again 
using unweighted kappa statistics.
To address the homogeneity and internal consistency of the different domains we computed 
Cronbach's alpha and the average inter-item correlation (spearman's rho).
3. Results
3.1. Inter-rater reliability for the EASE
The EASE scores of the total sample (n=50) showed good reliability, with all items scoring a 
kappa above 0.5 (see Table 1). According to the classification of Landis & Koch (1977), six of 
the  items  showed moderate  agreement  (kappa between  0.41  and 0.60),  44  items  showed 
substantial agreement (kappa between 0.61 and 0.80) and 22 items showed almost perfect 
agreement (kappa between 0.80 and 1.00). The mean kappa score for all EASE items was 
0.76, showing substantial agreement between raters for the score for the whole interview. 
When only the high-schizotypy participants were considered (n=30), the reliability was still 
acceptable but not as good as for all participants (see Table 1). All items scored a kappa above 
0.45. Eleven of the items showed moderate agreement, 40 items showed substantial and 21 
items showed almost perfect agreement.
For dichotomous scoring, two items showed slight agreement (kappa between 0.21 and 0.4). 
Twenty-three of the items showed moderate agreement, 35 items showed substantial 
agreement and 11 items showed almost perfect agreement. Kappa for one item, 4.3.2, could 
not be calculated as no participant scored more than 0 on this item using dichotomous scoring. 
3.2. Internal consistency
Internal consistency for the whole scale was found to be excellent (α = 0.95). The average 
inter-item correlation for the whole scale was moderate (r = 0.27).
Internal consistency was also calculated for each domain separately. This data is shown in 
table 3, alongside mean kappa scores for each domain.
3.3. Psychometric differences between high- and low-SPQ groups
As expected, the high-SPQ group scored significantly higher than the low-SPQ group in the 
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EASE  scale.  An  independent  samples  t-test  between  the  high-schizotypical  (M=63.27, 
SD=35.97)  and  low-schizotypical  (M=11.75,  SD=10.58)  groups  was  significant; 
t(36.10)=7.30, p<0.01. With matched samples only (high n=20; low n=20). An independent 
samples t-test between the high-schizotypical (M=66.15, SD=36.26) and low-schizotypical 
(M=11.75, SD=10.58) groups was also significant; t(22.21)=6.44, p=0.01. Table 4 provides 
descriptive statistics for total and domain scores of the EASE, and total and subscale scores 
for the PDI, comparing the scores of the high-schizotypy and low-schizotypy groups. 
4. Discussion
The  present  study sought  to  explore  whether  non-clinical  participants  would  report  self-
disorder  symptoms  and  whether  such  symptoms  can  be  reliably  assessed  by a  modified 
version of the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (EASE). Of special interest was 
whether  the  occurrence  of  self-disorder  symptoms  depends  on  psychometrically  defined 
schizotypy, and whether reliable assessment of these symptoms is possible in a sub-sample of 
participants with a high degree of schizotypical traits. 
The results show that the ratings of self-disorder symptoms achieve - on average - substantial 
inter-rater reliability in a non-clinical sample. Reliability of more than 90% of single items 
can  be  considered  at  least  substantial  (see  Landis  and  Koch,  1977,  for  interpretation  of 
magnitude). 
When the ratings of symptoms were dichotomised into 0 (absent) and 1 (present), the inter-
rater  reliability  was  acceptable  but  slightly  lower  for  most  items.  Hence  it  seems 
advantageous to have a more gradual rating when assessing self-disorder symptoms in a non-
clinical sample. 
Finally, inter-rater reliability scores are only slightly lower when looking only at the more 
homogenous group of participants with a high SPQ score (n=30). Self-disorder symptoms 
were more common in participants with high SPQ scores, and nine symptoms listed in the 
EASE were at least mildly present in at least 50% of highly schizotypical participants. These 
results clearly show that self-disorder symptoms vary with the degree of schizotypy, and that 
certain symptoms are common in highly schizotypical participants, at least in a mild form.
The prevalence of self-disorder symptoms in the high SPQ group is remarkable, because none 
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of the participants had been treated for schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder, or fulfilled 
the DSM criteria for such a disorder.  Although the extent of self-disorder symptoms was not 
directly  compared  to  a  patient  sample,  it  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  people  high  in 
schizotypy report  self-disorder symptoms in a way that allows reliable rating.  In fact,  the 
inter-rater  reliability obtained in  the present  study is  comparable to  values  found in  both 
schizophrenia (Norgaard & Parnas, 2012) and first-admission psychosis patients (Møller et 
al., 2011). 
The association between schizotypy and anomalies of self-experience may not surprise, as the 
two constructs overlap to some extent. The definition of high schizotypy as provided by the 
SPQ does include a number of self-disorder like symptoms. However, prior to this study it  
was not clear to what extent non-clinical participants would report self-disorder symptoms. As 
shown in table 2, there were a number of symptoms which were at least mildly present in at 
least 50% of the high SPQ group. Notably, none of these items directly refers to defining traits 
of  the  schizotypy  concept.  For  example,  thought  block,  thought  pressure,  and  thought 
interference belong to the “formal thought disorders” of schizophrenia (Waters & Badcock, 
2010) but  are  not explicit  characteristics of  schizotypy.  The present  data  suggest  that  the 
EASE may be useful to specify the exact nature of such cognitive abnormalities in persons 
high in schizotypy.
Another  symptom  with  a  substantial  prevalence  in  the  high-SPQ  group  (table  2)  was 
hyperreflectivity. The excessive self-monitoring of hyperreflectivity may be conceived as a 
subset  of  the exaggerated self-consciousness  of  hyperreflexivity (see Sass  et  al.,  2013 for 
discussion of the relation of these two concepts). Hyperreflexivity describes the experience of 
excessively  attending  to  and  analysing  the  normal  processes  of  the  body  and  mind, 
hypothesized  to  be  one  of  the  core  features  of  schizophrenia  (Sass  and  Parnas,  2003). 
Hyperreflexivity has also not been considered a symptom of schizotypy so far. Its substantial  
prevalence in the high-SPQ group therefore corroborates the notion that participants high in 
schizotypy  report  anomalous  self-experience  that  goes  beyond  the  defining  traits  of  the 
sychizotypy concept and resembles phenomena observed in patients with schizophrenia. 
The subscales referring to the EASE's five theoretically-driven domains proved sufficiently 
homogenous  in  terms  of  internal  consistency and average  inter-item correlation,  with  the 
exception of a rather low Cronbach’s α for domain four (demarcation/transitivism), likely due 
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to the small number of item in this sub-scale. Apart from this, the psychometric properties of 
the  subscales  suggest  the  domains  represent  reliable  facets  of  the  general  construct  of 
anomalous self-experience. However, sample sizes of the present and earlier studies were not 
large enough to allow multivariate testing of the theoretically suggested factor structure. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  present  study showed  the  applicability  of  the  EASE to  non-clinical 
samples, it may encourage future studies with larger samples. Specifically, it appears desirable 
to  examine  a  larger  group  of  highly  schizotypical  participants,  as  these  present  with  a 
substantial  portion  of  self-disorder  symptoms,  which  reflect  the  phenomenological  and 
biological  relatedness  of  schizotypy  and  schizophrenia.  A  validated  factor  structure  of 
anomalous  self-experience  in  schizotypy  will  improve  research  in  the  neurological  and 
cognitive correlates of self-disorder symptoms and thus enable progress in our understanding 
of self-disorder symptoms in the schizophrenia spectrum.
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Table 1: Kappa scores for each EASE item for all participants (N=50)
Items 
1.1-
2.x
Kappa (k)
Items 
2.12-
5.8
Kappa (k)
All High only Dich score† All High only
Dich 
score†
1.1 0.71 * 0.70 * 0.67 * 2.12 0.77 * 0.80 * 0.56
1.2 0.80 * 0.78 * 0.65 * 2.13.2 0.62 * 0.60 0.60
1.3 0.73 * 0.67 * 0.51 2.13.3 0.80 * 0.73 * 0.68 *
1.4 0.76 * 0.72 * 0.64 * 2.13.4 0.75 * 0.71 * 0.59
1.5 0.81 * 0.80 * 0.74 * 2.13.5 0.80 * 0.77 * 0.62 *
1.6 0.63 * 0.61 * 0.48 2.13.6 0.85 ** 0.85 ** 0.83 **
1.7.1 0.87 ** 0.85 ** 0.82 ** 2.14 0.81 * 0.78 * 0.50
1.7.2 0.80 * 0.82 ** 0.73 * 2.15 0.84 ** 0.79 * 0.72 *
1.7.3 0.94 ** 0.97 ** 1.00 ** 2.16 0.60 0.61 0.67 *
1.7.4 0.93 ** 0.93 ** 0.66 * 2.17 0.83 ** 0.80 * 0.70 *
1.8 1.00 ** 0.92 ** 0.88 ** 2.18.1 0.63 * 0.65 * 0.43
1.9 0.88 ** 0.87 ** 0.76 * 2.18.2 0.65 * 0.66 * 0.73 *
1.10 0.82 ** 0.79 * 0.61 3.1.1 0.74 * 0.81 ** 0.74 *
1.11 0.94 ** 0.94 ** 0.77 * 3.1.2 0.68 * 0.67 * 0.79 *
1.12.1 0.82 ** 0.79 * 0.78 * 3.2 0.80 * 0.77 * 0.81 **
1.12.2 0.85 ** 0.82 ** 0.79 * 3.3 0.57 0.67 * 0.54
1.13 0.73 * 0.73 * 0.65 * 3.4 0.71 * 0.77 * 0.78 *
1.14 0.56 0.48 0.43 3.5 0.69 * 0.67 * 0.30
1.15 0.79 * 0.83 ** 0.66 * 3.6 0.66 * 0.59 0.30
1.16 0.74 * 0.77 * 0.65 * 3.7 0.57 0.51 0.42
1.17 0.69 * 0.64 * 0.48 3.8 0.80 * 0.75 * 0.44
2.1.1 0.87 ** 0.87 ** 0.63 * 3.9 0.78 * 0.77 * 0.66 *
2.1.2 0.79 * 0.79 * 0.88 ** 4.1 0.86 ** 0.85 ** 0.79 *
2.2.1 0.62 * 0.57 0.46 4.2 0.92 ** 0.92 ** 1.00 **
2.2.2 0.74 * 0.70 * 0.50 4.3.1 0.86 ** 0.82 ** 0.67 *
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2.2.3 0.78 * 0.85 ** 0.65 * 4.3.2 0.85 ** 0.78 * Insufficient data
2.3.1 0.73 * 0.71 * 0.63 * 4.4 0.58 0.54 0.46
2.3.2 0.60 0.54 0.46 4.5 0.69 * 0.67 * 0.56
2.4 0.64 * 0.58 0.52 5.1 0.90 ** 0.89 ** 0.79 *
2.5.1 0.82 ** 0.78 * 0.61 * 5.2 0.84 ** 0.79 * 0.85 **
2.5.2 0.94 ** 0.94 ** 1.00 ** 5.3 0.67 * 0.65 * 0.66 *
2.6 0.65 * 0.63 * 0.51 5.4 0.80 * 0.79 * 0.50
2.7 0.62 * 0.56 0.59 5.5 0.85 ** 0.82 ** 0.68 *
2.8.1 0.79 * 0.81 * 0.69 * 5.6 0.76 * 0.75 * 0.62 *
2.8.2 0.80 * 0.85 ** 0.81 ** 5.7 0.80 * 0.90 ** 1.00 **
2.x 0.72 * 0.66 * 0.70 * 5.8 0.63 * 0.45 0.49
Note: * Substantial agreement; ** Almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977)
           † scores coded dichotomously
           EASE = Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience
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Table 2: Items on which at least 50% of high-SPQ group scored at least mildly present:
Item Description
N Participants scoring 
at least mildly present 
(% in brackets)
1.9 Ambivalence 20 (67%)
1.3 Thought pressure 19 (63%)
2.13.3 Anxiety: Subtype 3: phobic anxiety 19 (63%)
1.6 Ruminations-obsessions 18 (60%)
2.6 Hyperreflectivity; increased reflectivity 16 (53%)
2.13.4 Anxiety: Subtype 4: social anxiety 16 (53%)
1.1 Thought interference 15 (50%)
1.4 Thought block 15 (50%)
2.12 Loss of common sense/perplexity/lack of natural evidence 15 (50%)
Table 3:  Reliability scores for the five domains of the EASE scale
Do
ma
in
Mean Kappa Cronbach's alpha Average inter-item correlation
 high & 
low
 high 
only
 dich 
coded: 
all †
 high 
& low
high 
only
dich 
coded: 
all
 high 
& low
high 
only
dich 
coded: 
all †
1 0.80 0.78 0.68 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.24 0.15 0.23
2 0.74 0.73 0.64 0.86 0.77 0.86 0.18 0.11 0.18
3 0.70 0.70 0.58 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.30 0.28 0.27
4 0.79 0.76 0.70 0.57 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.20 0.16
5 0.78 0.76 0.70 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.24 0.18 0.26
Note: † scores coded dichotomously; EASE = Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience
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Note: SPQ = Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for EASE and PDI scores comparing high-schizotypy and low-schizotypy 
groups
High SPQ  group 
(n=30)
Low SPQ 
group (n=20)
High and low 
group combined 
(N=50)
Effect 
size T-test
M SD M SD M SD d t p
EASE total score 63.3 36.0 11.8 10.6 42.7 38.2 1.8 7.3 <0.001
EASE Domain 1 26.0 14.8 5.4 5.6 17.8 15.7 1.7 7.0 <0.001
EASE Domain 2 23.6 13.1 4.5 3.9 16.0 14.0 1.8 7.5 <0.001
EASE Domain 3 6.0 6.4 0.7 1.0 3.9 5.7 1.0 4.4 <0.001
EASE Domain 4 3.4 3.5 0.5 0.8 2.2 3.1 1.0 4.3 <0.001
EASE Domain 5 4.3 4.6 0.7 1.8 2.8 4.1 1.0 3.8 <0.001
PDI total 7.4 2.7 2.1 2.2 5.3 3.6 2.1 7.3 <0.001
PDI distress 19.1 11.0 4.0 4.4 13.1 11.7 1.7 6.8 <0.001
PDI preoccupation 20.3 9.7 4.4 4.9 13.9 11.3 2.0 7.6 <0.001
PDI conviction 21.3 9.3 6.6 7.7 15.4 11.3 1.7 6.1 <0.001
Note: SPQ = Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire; 
EASE = Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience;
PDI = Peters Delusions Inventory
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Appendix: Interview questions
1 Cognition and stream of consciousness
1.1 Thought interference
Do thoughts ever pop into your head unbidden or do you ever have thoughts which 
feel strange to you?
If yes: Do these thoughts ever break your line of thinking?
1.2 Loss of thought ipseity (‘Gedankenenteignung’)
Do your thoughts sometimes feel strange, as if they do not belong to you?
Do you sometimes have the feeling that someone is reading with you while you are 
reading a book, even if no one is there?
1.3 Thought pressure
Do you ever feel as if there are so many thoughts in your head that you cannot keep 
track of them all?
Does it ever feel as if thoughts are pressing out from inside your head?
1.4 Thought block
Do thoughts ever stop abruptly, slip away or empty from your mind entirely?
If yes: Do the thoughts fade gradually, or do they disappear suddenly?
1.5 Silent thought echo
Do you ever feel that thoughts are echoing in your head?
1.6 Ruminations-obsessions
Do you ever feel that you have to think about something over and over again? Or that 
thoughts come again and again, without you wanting them to?
If yes: When are these situations? What are you thinking about?
If unclear: Do you know why it is that you think about some things very often?
If unclear: Do you have to think about things a lot because you find them confusing, or 
because you feel depressed?
If yes: Do you feel as if these thoughts are irrelevant or ridiculous? What is the content 
of these thoughts?
If yes: Are these thoughts about aggressive or sexual acts? Do you find the content of 
these thoughts unpleasant or disgusting? 
If yes: Are there any actions or rituals which you perform because of these thoughts?
1.7 Perceptualization of inner speech or thought
Do you ever feel that you can hear or see your own thoughts?
If yes, do you hear them as if they came from inside your head or outside?
Do you feel like your thoughts are being written down?
Are your thoughts ever so loud that other people can hear them?
Do you ever feel like your thoughts are echoing or resonating outside of your head?
1.8 Spatialization of experience
Do you ever feel that thoughts or feelings are occurring just within one specific area of 
your head?
1.9 Ambivalence
Do you find it hard to decide between two or more options?
1.10 Inability to discriminate modalities of intentionality
Do you ever feel uncertain about whether what you are experiencing is happening 
right now or is a memory or fantasy?
1.11 Disturbance of thought initiative/intentionality
Do you ever find it difficult to get all your thoughts in order so that you can act 
accordingly? For example, when you are cooking or writing an essay.
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1.12 Attentional disturbances
Do you sometimes find it hard to pay attention to something because you are so 
distracted by particular details?
Do you sometimes have difficulty in paying attention to several things at once?
1.13 Disorder of short-term memory
Are you forgetful? Do you find it difficult to keep information in your mind a long 
period of time?
1.14 Disturbance of time experience
Do you ever have the strange feeling that time is rushing ahead or slowing down 
suddenly?
Do you ever feel as if your whole life takes place only now or only in the past?
1.15 Discontinuous awareness of own action
Do you ever find yourself somewhere and not remember how you got there?
1.16 Discordance between expression and expressed
Do you sometimes feel that what you show to the outside world, such as how you 
behave or how your face appears to other people, does not adequately represent the 
way that you feel?
1.17 Disturbance of expressive language function
Do you ever find it difficult to find the right words for what you want to say?
2 Self-awareness and presence
2.1 Diminished sense of basic self
Do you feel that you might not exist at all?
Do you ever feel unsure about who you are?
Do you find it difficult to form your own opinions on issues, even when you are 
familiar with the subject?
If yes: Did you first feel like this as a child or a teenager?
2.2 Distorted first-person perspective
Do your thoughts ever feel like they don't belong to you?
Do you ever feel that you do not control your own actions?
Do you ever feel like you are unsure where your body is? Does it feel as is your body is sitting 
behind your actual self?
2.3 Psychic depersonalization (self-alienation)
Do you ever feel that you have moved away from yourself, or are there moments in 
which you feel that who you are has changed?
If yes: Do you feel this way at times when you are deeply depressed?
2.4 Diminished presence
Do you find it difficult to be effected or touched by outside events or other people?
If yes: Is this because you feel that there is a barrier between you and the world?
If yes: Is this because you feel that your perceptions are faded – e.g. that colours seem 
muted?
2.5 Derealization
Do you ever find your surroundings are strange, meaningless or lifeless?
If yes: Is this a general impression of the world around you, or is it only specific 
details?
2.6 Hyperreflectivity; increased reflectivity
Do you sometimes have to think about yourself or other things very intensively? Does 
this make it difficult for you to act spontaneously, or make everyday actions like eating or 
drinking difficult?
Page 88
2.7 I-split (‘Ich-Spaltung’)
Do you ever feel that your self has been divided into more than one part?
If yes: Do you feel as if you had been divided, or are you really made of many parts?
If yes: Can you feel these different parts in certain places in your body? For example, 
that part of your self is in your left hand?
If yes: Why do you think that you feel this way?
2.8 Dissociative depersonalization
Have you ever had an out-of-body experience - the feeling of having left your body 
and being able to see yourself from the outside?
If yes: Did you imagine this experience and see it in your “mind's eye”, or did you 
literally leave your body?
If yes: During this experience, were you able to see yourself from the outside?
2.9 Identity confusion
Do you ever feel as if you are someone else?
2.10 Sense of change in relation to chronological age
Do you ever feel like you are very much younger or older than you are?
2.11 Sense of change in relation to gender
Are you sometimes unsure about your gender?
Do you have problems with your sexual orientation? 
2.12 Loss of common sense/perplexity/lack of natural evidence
Do you sometimes think intensively about simple things, such as why it is that traffic 
lights have three colours?
2.13 Anxiety
Do you sometimes feel suddenly very afraid or panicked? Do you experience fear of 
dying, or bodily symptoms like finding it hard to breathe, shivering, feeling dizzy or 
breathing quickly?
Do you have strong feelings of anxiety or panic without the bodily symptoms just 
described?
Do you feel like this when confronted by something specific – for example, heights, 
small rooms or certain animals?
Do you feel like this when you are in social situations, such as a work meeting or a 
party?
Do you feel anxious and tense all the time, for no particular reason?
Do you feel anxious because other people mean to harm you?
2.14 Ontological anxiety
Do you think that the world is a dangerous place? 
Do you often feel like something bad is about to happen? 
Do you feel exposed to the world and other people?
2.15 Diminished transparency of consciousness
Do you have the constant feeling that you are not fully conscious, or that you are not 
entirely there?  
Do you feel as if there is a always a veil over your thoughts and feelings?
2.16 Diminished initiative
Are there some things that you want to do, but find it hard to get started?
2.17 Hypohedonia
Do you find it hard to experience pleasure, such as when eating food, reading a book 
or having sex? 
What do you take pleasure from in life?
2.18 Diminished vitality
Do you often feel tired, exhausted and lacking in energy?
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If yes: How often do you feel this way? How long does this feeling last?
If yes: Can you explain why you feel this way?
3 Bodily experiences
3.1 Morphological change
Do you ever feel like part of your body is getting larger or smaller? 
Or as if it has become very heavy or very light?
If yes: Does this feeling happen in one particular part of your body, or is it all over?
If yes: Are these changes visible to you?
3.2 Mirror-related phenomena
Have you ever looked in a mirror and felt that your face has changed? 
Or do you look in the mirror often because you are afraid of such changes?
Or do you avoid looking in the mirror, because you are afraid of such changes?
3.3 Somatic depersonalization (bodily estrangement)
Do parts of your body ever feel as if they are wrong; like your body does not fit 
together properly?
3.4 Psychophysical misfit and psychophysical split
Do you ever feel as if you don't fit into your body? For example, do you have the 
impression that your body is too big or too small? 
3.5 Bodily disintegration
Does it ever feel as if your body disintegrates, dissolves into pieces or vanishes?
3.6 Spatialization (objectification) of bodily experiences
Did you ever feel overly aware of parts of your body?  For example, can you feel the 
roar of blood under your skin?
If yes: Do you experience this as overpowering?
3.7 Cenesthetic experiences
Do you ever have unusual sensations in your body, such as numbness, stiffness, 
unexplained pain, tingling, electric sensations or unexplained warmth or coldness?
3.8 Motor disturbances
Do you sometimes feel as is parts of your body have moved, when they have not?
Do parts of your body ever move without you meaning them to?
Do you ever find yourself suddenly unable to move or speak, as if your movements 
are blocked?
Do you ever have a sudden feeling of weakness in your arms or legs, like you drop 
something because your hands suddenly become very weak?
Do you ever find it difficult to perform habitual actions such as getting dresses or 
brushing your hair?
3.9 Mimetic experience
Do you ever feel as if there is a link between your movements and someone else's? 
Like other people are mirroring the way that you move?
4 Demarcation/transitivism
4.1 Confusion with the other
Do you ever feel as if your thoughts or feelings are mixed up with someone else's?
4.2 Confusion with one’s own specular image
When you look in a mirror or at a photo of yourself, do you ever feel confused about 
whether you are still yourself or if you are the reflection or image?
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4.3 Threatening bodily contact and feelings of fusion with another
Do you find it threatening when other people come close to you or touch you? Do you 
feel this way even when you know the other person well?
If yes: Can you explain why this frightens you?
Do you ever feel that you might stop existing when you are close to another person?
4.4 Passivity mood (‘Beeinfl ussungsstimmung’)
Do you often have the feeling that something very bad is going to happen to you, 
without you being able to influence it? Do you have a concrete idea of what it will be?
4.5 Other transitivistic phenomena
Are you sometimes unsure about where the boundary is between you and the outside 
world?
Do you ever feel that you are too open to the influences of the outside world? Or do 
you feel as if you have very thin skin?
5 Existential reorientation
5.1 Primary self-reference phenomena
Do you sometimes experience an immediate connection between yourself and external 
events or other people – for example, that your behaviour is reflected in the clouds?
5.2 Feeling of centrality
Do you feel as if you are the center of the world or that everything that happens in the 
world is dependent on you?
5.3 Feeling as if the subject’s experiential field is the only extant reality
Do you ever feel that things stop existing when you close your eyes?
5.4 ‘As if’ feelings of extraordinary creative power, extraordinary insight into hidden 
dimensions of reality, or extraordinary insightinto own mind or the mind of others
Do you feel as if you have special powers or special knowledge about the world?
5.5 ‘As if’ feeling that the experienced world is not truly real, existing, as if it was only 
somehow apparent, illusory or deceptive
Do you ever feel for a moment that the world is not really there?
Do you sometimes get the impression that the world is an illusion or trick?
If yes: Does it feel that way to you too?
5.6 Magical ideas linked to the subject’s way of experiencing
Do you sometimes feel that something changes in the world, because you have done or 
thought something in particular? For example, is the weather changed by your mood? 
5.7 Existential or intellectual change
Have you been unusually absorbed in topics such as religion, the supernatural or 
philosophy?
If yes: What made you interested in these things?
5.8 Solipsistic grandiosity
Do you have the impression that in contrast to you, other people are silly or ignorant? 
For example, that other people are preoccupied with shallow things?
Is everything that you're interested in very important?
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Abstract: 
Schizophrenic subjects are known to show normal  or faster visually-guided saccades 
but  slower  volitional  saccades,  compared to  healthy controls.  A somewhat  similar 
pattern  of  performance  can  be  found  in   non-clinical  high-schizotypy people.  We 
considered that this performance may be related to the level of self disorder symptoms 
found in high-schizotypy people.
The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between schizotypy, 
disorders  of  self,  visually-guided  and  volitional  saccades  in  people  who  are  non-
clinical but high in psychometrically-defined schizotypy. We examined  participants 
with  either  high  (n=13)  or  low  (n=13)  schizotypy  scores  on  an  eye  tracking 
experiment involving both visually-guided and volitional saccades. Median latencies 
for each condition were compared between the high and low schizotypy groups. There 
were no significant group differences between latencies in any condition. 
In the group with high schizotypy scores,  a strong negative correlation was found 
between  self-disorder  scores  and  latencies  on  cued  and  uncued  visually-guided 
saccades (-0.66 and -0.70 respectively). No significant correlation was found between 
latencies and schizotypy scores in this group. As such, faster latencies for visually-
guided saccades were shown to be associated with self disorders specifically, not with 
schizotypy  generally.  This  provides  first  evidence  of  a  ink  between  self  disorder 
symptoms and performance on eye movement tasks.
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Introduction
Saccades,  eye  movements  characterised  by  short  latencies  (~200ms)  and  brief  durations 
(between 20 and 120ms) (Gooding & Basso, 2008), have been a major topic in schizophrenia 
research.  Saccades  can be classified into two types:  slower volitional  saccades  and faster 
visually-guided saccades.1 Schizophrenic patients are unimpaired on visually-guided saccades 
but impaired on volitional saccades (Reuter & Kathmann, 2004). The unimpaired visually-
guided saccades  demonstrate  that  it  is  the generation and/or  execution of  a  willed  action 
specifically that is impaired in slower volitional saccades. Much investigation has focused on 
the antisaccade task (e.g., Fukushima et al., 1988; 1990; Clementz et al., 1994; Katsanis et al., 
1997), in which the appearance of a target induces a visually-guided saccade which must be 
overridden  by  a  volitional  saccade  in  the  opposite  direction  (Hutton  &  Ettinger,  2006). 
Patients with schizophrenia are  impaired on this  task,  showing more errors than controls, 
suggesting a difficulty in inhibiting reflexive behaviours (see Reuter et al., 2007 for a review).
Despite extensive research, there remains a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between 
cognitive  deficits  and  the  specific  symptoms  of  schizophrenia.  In  order  to  examine  this 
relationship without the confounds of medication and/or general cognitive impairment, non-
clinical high-schizotypy subjects can be investigated. Schizotypy is a psychometric measure 
of a dimension of uncommon and odd experiences and behaviours which relates to increased 
risk  for  developing  schizophrenia  (Cyhlarova  & Claridge,  2005),  and  it  is  predicted  that 
schizotypical individuals would show similar patterns of performance on eye movement tasks 
to schizophrenia patients. Highly schizotypical but non-clinical populations thus provide an 
important source of knowledge about the symptoms of schizophrenia spectrum disorders in 
the context of healthy functioning. 
High-schizotypy individuals have been shown to make more errors on the antisaccade task 
than controls (Holzman et al,  1995; O'Driscoll  et  al.,  1998; Gooding, 1999). On visually-
guided saccade tasks, most studies have found no difference in saccade accuracy or latency 
when comparing high-schizotypy individuals to controls (e.g., Gooding, 1999; Klein et al., 
2000; Aichert et al., 2012). However, a study by Ettinger et al. (2004) found that latency on 
visually-guided saccades was reduced in high-schizotypy participants with thought disorder 
1 fast saccades are often referred to in the literature as reflexive, however the term visually-
guided is  used  here  because  such saccades  are  not  necessarily  purely reflexive,  but  may 
involve a degree of volitionality (Hutton et al., 2008).
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symptoms. This demonstrates that performance on visually-guided saccades may be enhanced 
in  schizophrenia  spectrum  conditions.  However,  no  study  has  compared  performance  of 
simple volitional saccades  and visually-guided saccades in schizotypical people.
Some findings imply that the impairments in saccades seen in schizotypy studies are distinct 
to  a  subgroup  with  the  high-schizotypy  population  (Gooding,  1999;  Klein  et  al.,  2000; 
Smyrnis et al., 2003). We thus sought to identify factors within high-schizotypy populations 
which could be related to saccade task performance. We considered the level of self disorders 
as a possible candidate: symptoms such as the dissolution of the boundary between self and 
world, difficulty in distinguishing experience from a memory or a dream, or feeling as if the 
body is the wrong shape or size to hold the mind (Cermolacce, Naudin, & Parnas, 2007), 
which  have  traditionally  been  considered  paradigmatic  of  schizophrenia  (Simms,  1991). 
Recent  research  shows  that  highly  schizotypical  non-clinical  people  do  also  experience 
varying  levels  of  self  disorder  symptoms  (Torbet  et  al.,  in  preparation),  providing  an 
opportunity  to  relate  symptoms  of  schizophrenia  to  the  cognitive  impairments  found  in 
saccade task performance. 
The first research question we aimed to address was whether high-schizotypy people show the 
same  pattern  of  normal  or  enhanced  visually-guided  saccades  and  impaired  volitional 
saccades as schizophrenic people. We hypothesized that shorter visually-guided latencies and 
longer  antisaccade  and  volitional  latencies  would  also  be  found  in  high-schizotypy 
individuals, due to an underlying deficit common to the schizophrenia spectrum. Visually-
guided latencies are shorter because schizophrenia spectrum individuals are more stimulus-
bound and therefore react quickly to changes in the world. This same stimulus-boundness 
makes antisaccade latencies slower, because the effect of the stimulus must be inhibited in 
order to make the correct movement.  It  would be expected that simple volitional saccade 
latencies would also be slower, as they are internally initiated and must be induced without a  
change in external stimulus.
The  second  research  question  we  aimed  to  address  was  whether  performance  on  eye 
movements tasks was associated with the presence of self disorder symptoms among high-
schizotypy individuals. We hypothesized that higher levels of self disorders would be related 
to shorter visually-guided latencies and longer antisaccade and volitional latencies.
Thus we determined to investigate the relationship between schizotypy, self disorders, and 
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volitional and  visually-guided saccades. 
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Methods & Materials
Participants
Participants were recruited through an online survey process,  which used the Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991) to measure psychometric schizotypy. The SPQ 
has  74  items  and  is  based  on  the  DSM  IV criteria  for  schizotypal  personality  disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) but may also be used for non-clinical groups. The 
survey was advertised on mailing lists for students at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and 
the Freie Universität Berlin, in a local newspaper, and on a public classified advertisements 
board. We also gave a questionnaire on basic demographic data, including age, gender, years 
and level of education, and a questionnaire on conspiracy theories which addressed additional 
research questions which are not topic of the present paper. Informed consent was given by all 
participants before the survey was completed.
If  participants  completed  the  screening  and  were  willing  to  be  invited  for  a  personal 
assessment,  they  were  asked  for  contact  information.  1296  people  completed  the  online 
survey, of which 428 results were discarded from further analysis due to having not completed 
all  questions.  SPQ scores  for  the remaining 868 participants  were calculated.  Those who 
scored above the 90th percentile (SPQ score >=41, N=129) or below the 10th percentile (SPQ 
score <=7, N=145) were assigned to the high- and low-schizotypy groups, respectively. The 
cut-off scores are similar to those in Raine (1991), who found a cut-off for SPQ scores at 41 
for the 90th percentile and 12 for the 10th percentile.
Participants from the high- and low-schizotypy groups were invited to attend an experimental 
session  in  which  they  completed  questionnaires,  undertook  an  interview  regarding  self 
disorder symptoms (which is not the subject of this paper) and took part in the eye tracking 
experiment. 63 high-schizotypy people were invited in total (of which 30 accepted), and 25 
low-schizotypy people (of which 20 accepted). 
46 people completed the eye tracking experiment. Due to technical problems, the data of 20 
people  had  to  be  excluded  from  further  analysis.  The  remaining  groups  were  13  high-
schizotypy participants and 13 low-schizotypy participants. Groups did differ significantly in 
age (high: 25 years ±4.75 SD, low: 32 ± 10.13SD, p=0.01), but not sex (high: 10 female, low: 
8 female, X2(1)=0.181, p=0.67) or years spent in education (high: 13.10 years ±2.28 SD, low: 
12.55 ± 1.04SD, p=0.82).  
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We checked for diagnoses of mental disorders using the German version (Wittchen, Zaudig, & 
Fydrich, 1997) of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID I) (Spitzer, Williams, 
Gibbon & First, 1994). In the high-schizotypy group, four members had a former single major 
depression episode and one had a recurrent major depressive disorder currently in remission. 
One further high-schizotypy group member had bipolar I disorder (currently in a depressive 
episode) and one had biploar II disorder (currently in remission). None of the participants 
were currently in treatment for these symptoms. Formerly, three of the high-group had been in 
cognitive therapy treatments, but none took medication. There were no other axis I diagnoses. 
No  member  of  the  low-schizotypy  group  had  a  diagnosis.  In  order  to  check  whether 
participants  fulfilled  the  criteria  for  a  schizotypical  personality  disorder  we  applied  the 
respective part of the SCID II interview (Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon & First, 1994; German 
version by Wittchen, Zaudig & Fydrich, 1997). No participant fulfilled all of the criteria for 
schizotypical personality disorder.
Assessment instruments used
We measured self disorders using a modified version of the Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience (EASE) scale (Parnas et al., 2005) which has been shown to have good reliability 
in non-clinical populations (Torbet et al., in preparation). This semi-structured interview 
technique consists of open-ended questions regarding 72 symptoms related to disruptions of 
self. The interviews were videotaped and later each participant was rated for the presence of 
these symptoms. Each symptom was rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0=absent, 
1=questionably present, 2=present[mild], 4=present[moderate], 5=present[severe]) and ratings 
for all symptoms were summed to create a score of self disorders.
Eye tracking task and procedure
Participants sat in a dimly lit cabin in front of a monitor on which the task was presented. A 
chin rest and foot rest were used to reduce body movements. The 17 inch monitor was 20 
inches  away from the  eyes  of  the  participants.  Stimuli  were presented  using  Presentation 
version 16.3 (Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc) and recorded using the EyeLink system version 
2.22 (SR Research).
Each  block  began  with  the  experimenter  explaining  the  conditions  to  the  participant. 
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Instructions were also presented as text on the screen. Each block consisted of 10 practice 
trials, followed by 40 actual trials. Each trial began with the participant fixating on a central 
cross. After 1000-2000ms (randomised per trial), a symbol was changed on screen to signal 
that the participant should execute an eye movement. The symbol was a hexagonal arrow, 
width 0.44°,  height  0.26° (see Figure 1).  The symbol pointed to the left  or the right  and 
indicated the direction of eye movement required differed for each block. On half of trials the 
target for the eye movement was on the left, and on the other half it was on the right. Stimuli 
were  presented  in  white  on  a  black  background.  Blocks  were  presented  in  a  pseudo-
randomised  order. 
The experiment included seven different eye movement conditions, as follows (Kloft et al., 
2013,  also  see  Figure  1):  Cued  and  uncued  simple  volitional  saccades  (CSV and  USV, 
respectively) involved targets on both left and right sides, and a change in central stimulus 
which indicated the direction in which the eye movement should be directed. In the cued 
condition, the direction of the instruction was indicated before the change took place, but not 
in the uncued condition. Cued and uncued visually-guided saccades (CVG and UVG) were 
investigated, which were similar to the simple volitional saccades, except that there was also a 
change in the target stimulus at the time of central change. An antisaccade (ANT) task was 
included,  in  which  the  participants  were  instructed  to  execute  an  eye  movement  in  the 
opposite direction to the target. 
These saccade tasks represent different levels of volitional or agentic experience. A visually-
guided  saccade  is  a  stimulus-driven,  somewhat  automatic  reaction  to  a  change  in 
environment, and can thus be understood as primarily reflexive. A simple volitional saccade is 
self-initiated and agentic, and so is best understood as volitional. The antisaccade task is also 
considered volitional as it requires the inhibition of a reflexive movement by a volitional one.
The cued and uncued conditions serve to distinguish subcomponents of response selection and 
initiation, based on previous empirical findings that people with schizophrenia are impaired 
on saccade initiation specifically (Reuter et al., 2007). 
We also considered whether experiences of volition would be effected by different sensory 
modalities, and to this end we decided to investigate performance on tasks where the signal to 
execute a saccade was given by an auditory tone. Two conditions similar to the CSV were 
included in which the signal which indicated the time to make an eye movement was given by 
an auditory tone. In one condition, the tone was presented simultaneously with the central 
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change of the symbol (CSV + sound). In another, the tone was presented alone, without a 
central change (CSV sound only).
Data analysis
Data was analysed using SR Research Data Viewer 1.10 (SR Research) and SPSS 19 (IBM 
Corp).  Saccades  were  detected  when  velocity  of  eye  movement  was  at  least  31°/s, 
acceleration  was  at  least  100°/s2,  and  position  changed  by  more  than  1°.  Analysis  was 
performed on a time window from 800ms before the central change signal for a duration of 
1200ms.  Trials  were  excluded  for  meeting  any  of  the  following  criteria:  1)  no  saccade 
occurred within the time window, 2) the subject did not fixate  in the centre from 800ms 
onwards, 3) a blink occurred between 800 and 1000ms after the start signal, 4) any recording 
gaps larger than 150ms occurred. Saccades which occurred between 200ms before and 80ms 
after the start signal were classified as anticipatory saccades.
The median latency of correct saccades was determined for each subject in each of the seven 
conditions. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group (high versus 
low schizotypy), cue (cued versus uncued conditions), and volition (volitional versus visually-
guided  conditions)  on  saccade  latencies.  Correlations  between  variables  in  the  high-
schizotypy group were  also  investigated  using  a  bivariate  correlation  to  find  the  Pearson 
product-moment correlation. 
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Results
Accuracy 
The  percentage  of  errors  made  is  presented  in  table  1.  A within-subjects  ANOVA of 
percentage of error trials found a significant effect of cue (cued versus uncued), F(1,24)=5.08, 
p=0.03 and of volition (stimulus-driven versus volitional saccades), F(1,24)=6.34, p=0.02. A 
trend was found towards an interaction of volition x cue x group (high or low schizotypy), 
F(1,24)=3.32, p=0.08.
Latencies
A within-subjects ANOVA of latencies for correct saccades found a significant effect of cue 
(cued versus uncued), F(1,24)=53.31, p<0.01; of volition (stimulus-driven versus volitional 
saccades), F(1,24)=59.14, p<0.01; and a volition x cue interaction, F(1,24)=20.08, p<0.01.2 
Because of this interaction between volition and cue, posthoc t-tests were performed to test 
specific hypotheses. No significant difference between high and low groups was found in 
latencies  in  any condition  (see  table  2).  However,  latencies  of  antisaccades   were  in  the 
expected direction and showed a medium effect size, t(24) = 1.28, p=0.21, d=0.50, with high-
schizotypy  subjects  showing  faster  latencies  (M=262.92,  SD=51.68)  than  low-schizotypy 
subjects (M=285.38, SD=36.76). Latencies of the cued visually-guided saccade task  were 
also in the expected direction and showed a medium effect size, t(24) = 1.17, p=0.25, d=0.46, 
with  high-schizotypy  subjects  showing  faster  latencies  (M=205.54,  SD=21.25)  than  low-
schizotypy subjects (M=220.00, SD=39.17). 
Analysis of correlations between EASE score and latencies  focused on the high-schizotypy 
group only, because there was large variance of EASE score in the high group (M=59.46, 
SD=32.71)  but not in the low group (M=12.46, SD=12.38). In the high group (N=13), there 
was a strong correlation between EASE score and latencies for cued visually-guided saccades, 
r(11)=-0.66, p=0.02, and also for uncued visually-guided saccades, r(11)=-0.70, p=0.01. These 
correlations were also found in the high- and low- schizotypy groups combined (N=26) for 
cued visually-guided saccades,  r(24)=-0.51,  p=0.01,  and uncued visually-guided saccades, 
r(24)=-0.42, p=0.03. Figures 2 and 3 show scatter plots of latencies versus EASE score in the 
high-  schizotypy group for cued and uncued visually-guided saccades,  respectively.  Other 
2  To test the effect of age on latencies, an exploratory within-subjects ANOVA was performed with age as a 
covariate. This found no significant effects, though a trend of cue remained, F(1,24)=4.18, p=0.53. Further, 
age was not significantly correlated with any of the latencies.
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correlations between EASE and latencies in the high-schizotypy group were not significant. 
Correlations between EASE and saccadic latencies, and between SPQ and saccadic latencies, 
are presented in table 3.
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Discussion
This   study  sought  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  two  psychological  factors 
(schizotypy and self disorders) and two types of saccadic eye movement (visually-guided and 
volitional).  It  is  well  established  in  the  literature  that  people  with  schizophrenia  have 
unimpaired or enhanced visually-guided saccades but impaired volitional saccades (Reuter & 
Kathmann, 2004), and we investigated whether this pattern would hold for non-clinical high-
schizotypy people. We found no significant differences in latencies of either visually-guided 
or  volitional  saccades  between  high-  and  low-schizotypy  groups,  which  is  in  line  with 
previous findings regarding visually-guided saccades in schizotypical people (Gooding, 1999; 
Klein et  al.,  2000). Our study expands upon these results  by comparing simple volitional 
saccade and visually-guided saccade conditions, which had not previously been investigated 
in schizotypical people. These simple volitional saccades were also found to be unimpaired in 
schizotypical people, unlike people with schizophrenia who are typically impaired on this task 
(Reuter & Kathmann, 2004). This provides evidence that schizotypical people do not share 
the slowed volitional response latencies as schizophrenia patients, even though they do make 
more errors on the antisaccade task. This could indicate that schizotypical people are impaired 
in  the  inhibition  of  reflexive  movements,  rather  than  on  the  production  of  volitional 
movements.
The high-schizotypy group had shorter average latencies than the low-schizotypy group on 
visually-guided saccades. Although this difference was not significant when compared with a 
t-test,  the effect sizes were reasonable. This is in line with previous findings of enhanced 
visually-guided saccades in schizophrenia (Reuter et al., 2007). Our sample was too small to 
detect this effect at a significant level, but future research with a larger sample may reveal 
these effects.
We also found the expected pattern of the high-schizotypy group having longer lantencies on 
simple  volitional  saccades  than  the  low-schizotypy  group,  but  this  difference  was  not 
significant.  Surprisingly,  the  high-schizotypy  group  showed  longer  latencies  on  the 
antisaccade task than the low-schizotypy group, as we would have expected the opposite, but 
again the difference was not significant. There were  no significant difference between groups 
in the volitional saccade with sound conditions.
We also investigated the relationship between performance on eye movements task and self 
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disorders. Particularly notable for its novelty is our finding of a strong negative correlation 
between  latencies  for  visually-guided  saccades  and  self  disorder  scores.  No  significant 
correlations were found between EASE score and latencies  of simple volitional saccades or 
antisaccades, or between SPQ score and latencies on any conditions. So faster visually-guided 
saccades are related specifically to self disorders, not generally  to schizotypy. This is the first 
time that a link from self disorder symptoms to performance on  eye movement tasks has been 
made in the literature.
These finding can be understood in the light of theoretical work into disorders of self in the 
schizophrenia spectrum. Deficits in the feeling of volitionality or control over one's actions is 
related to the disturbance of ipseity or "mineness" of action in self disorders (Sass & Parnas, 
2003).  There is also some overlap between self disorders and unusual experiences of agency 
over one's body, such as in delusions of control in which patients believe that their bodily 
movements are being executed by another person (Blakemore, Oakley & Frith, 2003). Self 
disorders have been linked to disorders of self-monitoring and thus to anomalous experiences 
of agency, as  schizophrenia patients high in self disorders are less able to correctly identify 
their own actions (Kircher & Leube, 2003).
Given this link between self disorders and  disruptions in the sense of agency, our finding of a 
strong negative correlation between self disorders and visually-guided saccade latencies is 
especially relevant. Our findings supporting our hypotheses that people with high levels of 
self disorders would respond faster to changes in the environment than people without self 
disorders, because they are more receptive to or influenced by events in the outside world. 
This is supported by empirical findings that schizophrenia patients with delusions of control 
make more mistakes on self-recognition paradigms than controls, mistaking the movement of 
another person for their own (Jeannerod et al., 2003), and that high-schizotypy subjects had a 
weaker  sense  of  self-agency  than  controls  when  feedback  of  their  actions  was  distorted 
spatially (Asai and Tanno, 2007). 
Some  studies  investigating  high-schizotypy  populations  have  found  that  impaired 
performance on saccade tasks is particularly prominent in a subgroup who score very high on 
schizotypy (>2SD above the mean)  (Gooding, 1999; Klein et al., 2000; Smyrnis et al., 2003). 
These  very  high  schizotypy  individuals  could  also  be  those  experiencing  self  disorders, 
however, this could not be confirmed in this study as no individual scored more than 2SD 
above the mean on the SPQ.  and it may be that comparing individuals who score high and 
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low on self disorder symptoms would show group differences in saccadic latencies, but that 
this  effect is not strong enough to be found in groups based on schizotypy scores. Hence 
future research into eye movements in schizotypy may benefit from assessing  levels of self 
disorders as well.
Some limitations of the study must be considered. Firstly, there was a significant difference in 
age between the high- and low-schizotypy groups, with the low-group being older. It may be 
that  this  difference  in  age  affects  latencies,  however,  the  lack  of  significant  correlation 
between age  and latencies  argues  against  this.  A further  limitation  is  regarding the  large 
percentage  of  trials  on  which  an  error  was  made  across  the  sample.  There  were  non-
significant differences between groups in the number of errors made, with the high-schizotypy 
group making more errors on uncued simple volitional saccades and cued simple volitional 
saccades with sound. However, these error data are not reliable as due to technical issues we 
found an unusually high number of errors on volitional saccades in both groups compared to 
other studies. 
Conclusion
Using  eye  tracking  paradigms,  we  investigated  the  relationship  between  schizotypy,  self 
disorders  and visually-guided and volitional  saccades.  To extend the findings  of  impaired 
volitional saccades but unimpaired visually-guided saccades in schizophrenia, we compared 
latencies of simple volitional saccades in a high-schizotypy but non-clinical group to a low-
schizotypy non-clinical group. We found that simple volitional saccades were unimpaired in 
our high-schizotypy group. No significant difference in latencies between groups was found 
in any task. We did identify a strong negative correlation between visually-guided saccade 
latency and self disorder score. This may provide the basis for fruitful future research into eye 
movements,  such  as  examining  whether  schizophrenia  patients  with  high  levels  of  self 
disorders are  more impaired  on volitional saccades than patients without self disorders.
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Tables
Table  1:  descriptive  statistics  and  effect  sizes  for  percentage  of  errors  by  condition,  
comparing high-schizotypy (N=13) versus low-schizotypy (N=13) groups.
Description
Low group High group
t p d
M SD M SD
Cued simple volitional 
saccades
1.89% 4.72 1.48% 2.45 0.28 0.78 0.11
Uncued simple volitional 
saccades
3.36% 3.37 6.18% 6.83 -1.33 0.20 -0.52
Antisaccades 16.48% 21.23 19.70% 23.68 -0.36 0.72 -0.14
Cued visually-guided saccades 0% 0 0% 0 - - -
Uncued visually-guided 
saccades
3.15% 10.45 0.21% 0.75 1.01 0.32 0.4
Cued simple volitional 
saccades with sound 0% 0 7.69% 27.74 -1.00 0.33 -0.39
Uncued simple volitional 
saccades with sound 0% 0 0% 0 - - -
Table 2: descriptive statistics,  t-tests  and effect  sizes for latencies of  correct saccades  by  
condition, comparing high-schizotypy (N=13) versus low-schizotypy (N=13) groups. 
Description
Low group High group
t p d
M SD M SD
Cued simple volitional saccades 258 44 266 80 -0.33 0.74 -0.13
Uncued simple volitional 
saccades
324 38 338 81 -0.57 0.58 -0.22
Antisaccades 285 37 263 52 1.28 0.21 0.50
Cued visually-guided saccades 220 39 206 21 1.17 0.63 0.46
Uncued visually-guided 
saccades
225 38 219 27 0.49 0.63 0.19
Cued simple volitional saccades 
with sound 220 35 233 59 -0.66 0.51 -0.26
Uncued simple volitional 
saccades with sound 214 23 207 40 0.53 0.60 0.21
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Table 3: correlation matrix of EASE, SPQ and latencies for high-schizotypy (N=13) group.  
Values marked with * are significant at p<0.05 and ** at p<.01. 
Latencies
 CSV USV ANT CVG UVG
EASE
Pearson’s r -.453 -.242 -.351 -.656* -.701**
p-value .120 .425 .240 .015 .008
SPQ
Pearson’s r .037 .282 -.137 -.277 -.229
p-value .905 .351 .654 .360 .451
Abbreviations:  EASE:  Examination  of  Anomalous  Self-Experience;  SPQ:  Schizotypal  
Personality  Questionnaire;  CSV:  cue  simple  volitional  saccades;  USV:  uncued  simple  
volitional saccades; ANT: antisaccades; CVG: cued visually-guided saccades; UVG: uncued  
visually-guided saccades.
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Figures
Figure 1: representation of the task conditions
(adapted from Kloft et al., 2013, with permission)
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Cued visually-guided saccade 
Figure 2: Scatter plot of latencies for cued visually-guided saccades (in ms) versus EASE 
score in the high-schizotypy group (N=13), r(11)=-0.66, p=0.02.
Page 112
Uncued visually-guided saccade 
Figure 3: Scatter plot of latencies for uncued visually-guided saccades (in ms)  versus EASE 
score in the high-schizotypy group (N=13), r(11)=-0.70, p=0.01.
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